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# Cross Border Assessment between Liberia and Côte D'Ivoire: January and February 2012

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Security, Stabilization & Food  
Security

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## Acronyms

ACF	Action Against Hunger (NGO)
BIN	Bureau of Immigration and Naturalization (Liberia)
CC	Constitutional Council (of Côte D'Ivoire)
CDC	Congress for Democratic Change (Liberia)
CEI	Independent Electoral Commission (of Côte D'Ivoire)
CFA Franc	Franc of French Colonies in Africa
CFW	Cash For Work
CVR	Community Violence Reduction
DDRR	Disarmament, Demobilization, Reinsertion, and Reintegration
DRC	Danish Refugees Council
ECOWAS	Economic Community of West African States
FAO	Food and Agriculture Organization
FPI	Ivorian Popular Front
FN	Forces Nouvelle
FRCI	Republican Forces of Côte D'Ivoire
GoCI	Government of Côte D'Ivoire
GoL	Government of Liberia
IDP	Internal Displaced Population
IGA	Income Generating Activity
LD	Liberian Dollar
LNP	Liberian National Police
LRRC	Liberian Reintegration, Repatriation and Refugee Commission
LURD	Liberians United for Reconciliation and Democracy
MOA	Ministry Of Agriculture
MODEL	Movement for Democracy in Liberia
MPCI	Patriotic Movement of Côte D'Ivoire
MPIGO	Patriotic Movement of the Great West
MPJ	Movement for Justice and Peace
NRC	Norwegian Refugees Council
OCHA	Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs
PDCI	Côte D'Ivoire Democratic Party
RDR	Rally of the Republicans
RRR	Return, Reintegration, Recovery
SALW	Small Arms and Light Weapons
SGBV	Sexual and Gender Based Violence
SSR	Security Sector Reform
SV	Sexual Violence
TCN	Third Country Nationals
UNHCR	UN High Commission for Refugees
UNMIL	UN Mission in Liberia
UNOCI	UN Mission in Côte D'Ivoire
UNOWAS	United Nations Office for West Africa
UP	Unity Party
USD	United State Dollar
WASH	Water, Sanitation and Hygiene
WFP	World Food Programme


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# 1. Introduction

In November 2010, fighting began in Côte D'Ivoire as presidential candidates Alasanne Ouatarra and incumbent Laurent Gbagbo contested the election results. The international community accepted the results of Ouatarra's win but violence ensued. Beginning in November and throughout December 2010, approximately 3,500 refugees composed mostly of the Yacouba population from Côte D'Ivoire poured into adjacent Nimba County, Liberia (UNHCR, Ivorian refugees continue to enter Liberia, 2010). As fighting moved south and the Force Nouvelle (FN) won battles, the refugee population took on another dynamic. The Guere population began seeking refuge in southern Nimba and Grand Gedeh County, Liberia. And again, another influx of Kru and Guere refugees entered Liberia through the counties of River Gee and Maryland. Refugees were able to cross through the porous border between Liberia and Côte D'Ivoire which is separated by the Cavally. As refugees crossed, so did combatants from the crisis due to weak border patrol and a lack of separation of combatants and refugees as they entered camps in Liberia. By the end of April 2011, UNHCR estimated that 150,000 Ivorian and third country national (TCN) refugees entered Liberia (UNHCR, UNHCR, 2011). An estimated 4,000 civilian deaths were recorded during fighting.



Population movement became a major issue as refugees poured across the porous border into Nimba County initially in late 2010, then into Grand Gedeh and further south as the fighting pushed south from Man and west from Abidjan. In response to the refugee crisis, UNHCR established and operated six refugee camps: Bahn Camp (opened in February 2011), Ziah Camp (opened in March 2011), Solo Camp (opened in April 2011), Dugoe Camp (opened in April 2011), PTP Camp (opened in September 2011), and Little Wlebo (opened in April 2011). Populations fleeing into Liberia were a mixture of civilians and Liberian and Ivorian ex-combatants<sup>1</sup>. During the Liberian civil war many Liberians fled to Côte D'Ivoire to find refuge and in their turn, welcomed the Ivorian in 2011. In regions where food insecurity rate are very high, the arrival of many refugees has had a significant impact on village resources.

<sup>1</sup> Liberian ex-combatants who fled to Côte D'Ivoire during the Liberian Civil War.

Within Côte D'Ivoire, internally displaced persons (IDPs) set up camps in Duekoue area (4,557 IDPs), Guiglo, and Tai area in the West. These populations have expressed continuing security and livelihood risks that are preventing them from returning to their home.

With the inauguration of President Ouattara in April and the smooth election process and inauguration of President Ellen Sirleaf Johnson of Liberia, refugees have begun to return. In August, UNHCR, Government of Liberia (GoL) and Government of Côte D'Ivoire (GoCI) signed the Tripartite Agreement for the voluntary repatriation of refugees to Côte D'Ivoire and by December 2011, about 500 refugees were repatriated (LRRRC, 2011). The current refugee population is estimated at 69,561, with the largest portion in Grand Gedeh estimated at 36,720 (February 2012). When the area is not in conflict or dispute, the porous borders allow free movement of trade and economic migrants.

### ***Continuing Stabilization and Food Security Concerns after Ouattara's Inauguration***

Weak governance outside the capital coupled with poverty, food insecurity, and access to munitions creates a potential for destabilization. Poverty remains high in post conflict Liberia where 64% of the population is below the poverty line and 80% are underemployed (IMF 2008) which are destabilizing factors if not addressed properly. The border region is a very rich in resources such as gold, diamonds, fishing, and timber. In addition, the soil is extremely fertile. However, food security remains a concern on both sides of the Ivoirian-Liberian border as the 2010 conflict intensified food insecurity. It is estimated that approximately 60% of the population in Moyen-Cavally is now suffering from food insecurity. Interventions for food insecurity must be kept in mind the long standing problems before the crisis. Even though the average Liberian and Ivoirian do not make a lot of money from mining, it is perceived as a way to earn quick money and therefore, food crops are not developed. Unofficial mining continues as a result of weak governance and lack of education.

In May 2011, the war in Côte D'Ivoire officially ended with the inauguration of Ouattara as President (BBC News Africa, 2011). However, since September 2011, there have been numerous attacks. During interviews alone, attacks since September were mentioned about: Tai, Nigre, Man, Pehe, and Ziriglo. In addition, lootings along the Tai – Liberia border on the Ivorian side north of Tempo were mentioned. It is clear that armed elements continue to mobilize to commit such acts as mobilization remains easy and command structures remain intact.



Attacks mentioned in interviews that occurred since September 2011

Côte D'Ivoire remains in a fragile state as it waits for SSR, DDRR, and DTRC to be reached and felt in the Western regions. Liberia remains susceptible to Côte D'Ivoire's fragility as Liberia struggles to continue building rule of law in the state and faces a lack of economic opportunities. The armed groups do not respect boundaries and use the lack of capacity of the government and the porous border to their advantage. Meanwhile, populations do not only remain open to abuse, but also recruitment as social cohesion remains weak and land tenure issues flare into violent events. Reintegration and reinsertion and trials of former combatants in the population on both sides of the border need to be addressed. The Moyen Cavally<sup>2</sup> – Grand Gedeh area continues to be an area of security concern as well as the blind spot of security in the Tai – Grand Gedeh border. Both governments have a long road ahead for stabilization, but stabilization and effective cross border activities must commence in order to ensure existing tensions do not evolve into conflict and that governments are held accountable for human rights. Vulnerable populations susceptible to recruitment for fighting need to be addressed.

Security concerns and existing tensions are exacerbated by food insecurity. Stalling DDR and SSR in Côte D'Ivoire means armed groups will continue to patrol access to land and demand payment – furthering the cycle of food insecurity. As food insecurity is not addressed, more of the population will be vulnerable to recruitment for fighting.

<sup>2</sup> The new administration has re-labeled and redistricted Côte D'Ivoire. However, the assessment will refer to the old names since they were more commonly used while on assessment.



## ***Cross Border Assessment***

Out of these grave concerns grew the cross assessment which aims to achieve a cohesive, unified strategy that scrutinizes the cross cutting issues of security and stabilization, food security, and early recovery for a comprehensive plan to further peace and stability in the region. As armed actors deny access to land, food insecurity becomes a greater risk which in turn will cause security to increase as people fight over scarce resources. Land use and social cohesion exacerbate security and food security issues since the problems do not happen in a microcosm. This report attempts to link both components and provide a strategy to stop the cycle of instability in the region.

### **Objectives of each assessment include:**

#### *Security and Stabilization:*

- Impact of Ethnic and Political Factors
- Perspectives of Liberian and Ivorian Combatants
- Circulation of Small Arms and Light Weapons
- Perceptions of and Capacity of State Security Authorities
- Conflict Issues: Land Tenure
- Youth at Risk
- Return and Reintegration of Ivorian and Liberian Refugees/IDPs

#### *Food Security and livelihoods:*

- Key stabilization factors and influence on food security
- Cross-border trade and markets
- Land tenure, access to land, ethnicity and social cohesion factors

## **2. Methodologies**

Each consultant used a varying method of qualitative interviews and desk study for their components. Each component explains further in detail the methodology used.

### **2.1. Security Trends and Threats**

All interviews were semi-structured individual interviews (with the exception of one focus group discussion with women's groups in Toulepleu area and IDP camp in Tai) and lasted an average of 70 minutes. Key informants provided access to local populations. Due to the nature of the information, interviewees were not tape recorded since it would be misconstrued as collecting evidence on security issues. Interviews took place between January 23, 2012 – February 17, 2012, with the exception of UNOCI staff based in Abidjan who provided informal interviews on March 7 and 8, 2012. The aim of the

interviews is to provide a clear independent analysis of the security and stabilization situation on both sides of the border.

Using the qualitative data from the interviews and quantitative data from the NRC Land Tenure surveys and DRC Social Cohesion surveys, key areas of intervention were identified.

During interviews in Côte D'Ivoire, a translator was used. Three different translators were used during the assessment in Côte D'Ivoire. This was a major constraint since one translator was not available throughout the process. It should be noted that nuances in word choice were probably lost.

Identities of all Ivorian and Liberian interviewees are kept confidential to prevent revenge and retribution. If further information is needed, the consultant can be contacted directly.

Interviewees included Ivorian and Liberian returnees, Ivorian IDPs, UN agencies (UNMIL, UNOCI, UNHCR Liberia), NGO local staff working in Protection, suspected Ivorian and Liberian combatants, Ivorian chiefs, LRRRC, Gendarme, FRCI, Ivorian and Liberian Youth leaders, and Ivoirians who remained in their villages during the fighting.

## 2.2. Food Security

All interviews were semi-structured focus group with local leaders and village committees' members, followed by transect walk and series of unstructured interviews with households, groups and individuals which enabled the team to gain a clear understanding of the people living condition.

In both countries, the field trips were accompanied by members of WFP, FAO and Ministry of Agriculture. In Côte d'Ivoire, the Cross-border evaluation team joined the 2011 crop assessment mission organized by the Ministry of Agriculture, the Ministry of animal and fishing resources, the FAO and the WFP. The same assessment was done in Liberia but without the cross-border team.

Interviewees included Ivorian not affected directly by the crisis, Ivorian returnees, Ivorian IDPs, Ivorian directly affected by the crisis, Liberian in host communities, Liberian indirectly affected by the crisis, UN agencies (WFP, UNHCR, UNICEF), NGO.

After returning from the field, both consultants reviewed each other's information and combined analysis.

### *Assumptions*

- Interviewees provided honest perspectives and not misleading information
- Willingness of interviewees to participate
- Willingness and capacity of UN to share data
- Dates and names provided by interviewees were approximately correct
- Analysis period was one month. It is assumed the dynamic situation stayed more or less the same.
- Support from UN agencies and NGOs participating in study

### 3. Key Challenges and Priority Areas of Intervention

#### 3.1. Security and Stabilization

##### *Challenges*

- Tai and Grabo/Gbapet area remain a security blind spot for attacks, lootings, and unchecked human rights abuses by government forces, subsidiary militias and other armed groups.
- Mining areas in Grand Gedeh are places of potential exploitation, trafficking, and mobilization centers for young adults to participate in future conflicts if the opportunity arises
- In Liberia, the capacity to enforce Rule of Law remains weak while in Côte D'Ivoire the will to enforce Rule of Law aside from a military state remains weak as Abidjan is not able to decentralize. Both problems feed into lack of confidence in the state and insecurity in the border area
- Recruitment for fighting is not on-going but mobilization, due to a strong intact command structure, is extremely easy
- Populations on both sides of the border are traumatized.
- Security and Protection need to improve in country and cross border communication with each other to ensure survivors of violence receive best care and security actors are held accountable for their (in)actions
- Weapons hidden in the border region, namely in Tai-Tempo area and River Gee-Gpabet area continue to be a threat to stability
- No comprehensive DDR in Western Côte D'Ivoire
- Southern Nimba remains a site of insecurity but a safe place for commanders to plan – this area in places such as Dinlay and Bluntuo should not be forgotten

##### *Short Term Security Concerns*

- Harassment of returnees fueling desire for revenge in Côte D'Ivoire
- Human rights abuses remaining unchecked
- Skirmishes and looting along Tai border
- Tension in refugee affected communities in Ziah area
- If and as FRCI begins filing and ranking soldiers, those not included in the military deciding to establish an alternative militia

##### *Medium Term Security Concerns*

- Mobilization of former combatants as opportunities for fighting occur
- Mining areas remaining unchecked and becoming grounds for income generation that will contribute to mobilization
- Unpaid combatants in Nimba and Grand Gedeh seeking alternative means to obtain payment for services during conflict

##### *Long Term Security Concerns*

- Repeat of events during next election cycle if Côte D'Ivoire does not address underlying social cohesion and land tenure problems.
- Capacity of Liberia to respond to human rights and violence as UNMIL draws down

### *Interventions*<sup>3</sup>:

- UNOCI to increase civilian support with DDR and Human Rights officers<sup>4</sup> in the Tai and Grabo areas. If the area is to be perceived as not suitable for staff since most are UNVs, they can be placed in Guiglo to look after the area. Tai does have network connection and while the road is unpaved, it is extremely passable during dry season and as compared to the roads in Liberia.
- When the DDR process officially begins as a large scale operation<sup>5</sup>, RRR section of UNMIL along with the Liberian government need to assist youth in the country with alternative livelihood programs besides agriculture.
- RRR department in Liberia needs one field staff in Zwedru to open a dialogue with the former fighters to promote stability. Also, an RRR officer is needed in Monrovia to work with the Government of Liberia on how to integrate low level combatants and prosecute high ranking Liberian commanders who orchestrated recruitment and supplying munitions
- UN to conduct fewer assessments or realize recommendations of previous assessments and work on functional activities and plan forward.
- UNMIL, UNHCR, and UNOCI allow field staff to cooperatively and share information without viewing each other as competition
- UNMIL to support Rule of Law by building capacity and thinking of how to provide Rule of Law actors with the means to complete their jobs as UNMIL draws down. Government of Liberia needs a better system to finance Rule of Law and ensure minimum corruption by enforcing anti-corruption policies.
- Government of Côte D'Ivoire to allow nation-wide DDR and SSR. The military, gendarme, and police all need to make sure their ranks resemble the population of Côte D'Ivoire and include females. Sexual violence by armed actors is a problem in the West of the country and needs to be addressed. Confidence in the State is weak in the West. The longer the Government presence is not seen except as a military, the less confidence civilians will have, delegitimizing the government.
- Comprehensive DDR in Côte D'Ivoire to include all populations implicated in fighting
- Strategies on CVR integrate and build on existing protection mechanisms in each country
  - Gbapet, Grabo area could benefit from CVR activities that focus on dialogues before assaults. Many assaults seemed to occur over resources and then spill over into ethnic disputes.
  - Tai – Tempo area need assistance in establishing early warning systems that the communities can use if attacked. Dialogue needs to begin between the communities where attacks are taking place. DDR officers can assist with this.
  - School systems in Côte D'Ivoire in the Duekoe – Guilgo – Toulepluea are and Tai – Grabo area can be a great area to promote conflict resolution by using dialogue. Young person's generally set aside their differences while in school. Teachers need to harness this energy for positive conflict resolution for small disagreements which in turn will

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<sup>3</sup> Recommendations at the end of the paper provide further guidance on potential livelihoods projects and other details.

<sup>4</sup> At the time of assessment in January, DDR and Human Rights officers were not present. By March, the DDR department said they had placed a field officer in the Tai area but the officer is based in San Pedro which is a minimum three hour drive from Tai.

<sup>5</sup> Disarmament portion of DDR initiated for a few days in September or August? In addition, the DDR department has stated that they are collecting weapons with the assistance of Land Mine Action but were unable to provide locations of where weapons were being collected before this report was circulated.

provide the coping mechanisms for larger disputes they may encounter in the future. NGOs could be an asset in this area for CVR.

- The informal command structures need to be addressed by the Government of Liberia and UNOCI/Government of Côte D'Ivoire as the DDR process begins in Côte D'Ivoire. Mid ranking who recruited and mobilized for Gbagbo and Ouattara in Liberia need to be considered.
- High and mid ranking combatants in both Côte D'Ivoire and Liberia accused of mass human rights abuses need to be tried and held accountable for crimes – this includes those who fought for Ouattara and those who fought for Gbagbo. Both sides recruited combatants from Liberia. Both sides committed crimes.
- All programs need to have a psycho-social component to address war trauma.
  - Most fighters were not shy about explaining their history. RRR and DDR officers should have basic training in psycho-social support so when they come across former combatants, they can provide key messages to assist in their transition. Listening goes a long way.

### 3.2. Food Security

#### *Challenges:*

- South-Western Ivorian regions remain in critical food security situation.
- Lack of quality seed availability in Côte D'Ivoire and Liberia
- Issues to access the land and social cohesion in the Moyen-Cavally region which furthers tension within existing ethnic divisions and prevents Ivorians to access their plantations.
- Coping mechanisms put in place after the crisis by the households that help them to get income.
- Markets dysfunction in both countries due to conflict and the massive influx of refugees in Liberia.
- Lack of agriculture techniques in both countries but worse in Liberia.
- Resources are available in both countries to increase food security.
- Lack of education in Liberia due to two civil wars.

#### *Interventions:*

- Maintain food distributions or cash distributions in Côte D'Ivoire in Douékué, Bolequin, Toulepleu, Dananné and Bin-Houyé regions and in the refugees' camps in Liberia until the next harvest.
- Seeds distributions in the South-Western regions in Côte D'Ivoire, and in the host communities in Liberia and Côte D'Ivoire.
- Large program of school gardens in Côte D'Ivoire and Liberia.
- Large program of agriculture training.
- Nutrition and Wash sensitization.
- Support to the existing agriculture structures in both countries and support the creation of agriculture cooperatives.
- Support to the microcredit structures and extend access to microcredit.

## 4. Mobile Populations and Land Disputes

### 4.1. Refugee and IDP Populations

**“Some Ivoirians cannot return because they defended Liberians.”  
Liberian returnee from Moyen-Cavally**

For return and reintegration, four key populations need to be addressed:

- Returnees from Côte D’Ivoire and Liberia (including fighters who returned)
  - UNHCR Côte D’Ivoire anticipates the return of 55,000 Ivorian refugees
  - Liberian refugees abroad as they return to Liberia as the Cessation Clause is enacted
- Refugees not willing to return
  - UNHCR estimates that 14,000 Liberians will remain in Côte D’Ivoire and seek either residence permits or naturalization
  - UNHCR estimates 24,000 Ivorian refugees will remain in Liberia in 2012
- IDPs in Côte D’Ivoire
  - UNHCR estimates that 72,000 Ivoirian IDPs will return to their community in 2012 (UNHCR, UNHCR, 2011)
- Combatants that crossed between Liberia and Côte D’Ivoire as a result of weak screening for ex-combatants and porous, unchecked border areas. Combatants include:
  - Those who fought to defend their families as they fled
  - Those recruited to fight in the crisis for money
  - Commanders who exploited the instability in return for money

#### *Mobile Population*

The border population is usually very mobile, making it difficult for NGOs and UN agencies to determine who is a refugee, a former combatant, and who is a migrant. Most movement by refugees, returnees, and general population across borders involves:

- Access to fields, sometimes several kilometers away (average 7km)
- Access to markets, it sometimes requires several hours walking to reach them (on average 2 to 3 hours).
- Employment opportunities: many jobs are offered daily in plantations.
- Visit family in the surrounding villages or in urban area.

As a result of the porous border and interconnections between cross border populations, ex-fighters have been able to cross the border with ease for potential recruitment for fighting on the sides of both Ouattara and Gbagbo. As refugees came into Liberia, there was a poor screening system to determine if ex-combatants were entering the refugee camps; however, it seems most ex-combatants are in the host communities.

#### *Trauma*

The crisis caused many deaths and abuses. The population is traumatized. There is a real fear in some villages. For instance, women continue to flee into the bush when they hear a suspicious noise or if

"strangers" arrive in the village. Few organizations have provided psychosocial support to people suffering from trauma, which continues to have a direct impact on the activities of the village. As a result of PTSD, these people are not able to have an income generating activity or to leave their villages to access farms or markets located in a nearby village.



Refugee Camp location in Liberia

### *Ivorian Refugees and IDPs*

When speaking with Ivorian refugees in Grand Gedeh, the main impediments to returning were: armed elements, politics, land, fear of revenge, and Burkinabe. Across the border, those living in returnee communities feared the returnees taking their jobs and adding to the food insecurity. Likewise, IDPs expressed a concern over being targeted by the FRCI and affiliated militias and a concern over land being seized after fleeing the community.

For refugees remaining in Liberia, as Gbagbo's trial begins, camp security may need to increase. Protests should be allowed but violence should be prevented.

### *Returnees*

Many Ivoirians have returned to their villages. In Zouan-Hounien 90% of the people have returned, 60-70% in Toulepleu, and 50% in Blolequin. The massive displacement of population during the conflict coincided with the period of farm preparation and planting, which did not prevent many people of taking part in the rice crop season in 2011. Farmers' long time displacement has had an impact on cash crops as fields have become overgrown quickly and a long rehabilitation work of the farms had to be implemented if the farmers can even access the land.

### *Impact on Liberian Communities*

During the crisis and after, the Ivorians have shared their food with the Liberians, who in a great majority of cases, allowed them to access land to cultivate. Refugees are allowed to grow rice,

vegetables and cassava. Although cash crops are not authorized for refugees, it seems to establish a technical exchange between the two populations. The large majority of refugees in host communities do not intend to return to Côte D'Ivoire before the next harvest.

Access to Liberian lands was an issue in the Ziah area where returnee women in Côte D'Ivoire expressed that Liberians would not always allow access to land and a fight would ensue. For refugees deciding to stay, the issue of fair pay for refugees for work and what lands can be cultivated needs to be addressed. Tension has been increasing between refugees and host communities in the Ziah area as rights go unchecked and resources become more scarce. Due to bad road conditions, Ziah area remains a potential blind spot for those desiring to enter Côte D'Ivoire for a cross border raid.

### *Ivorian's Fearing and Blaming Liberians*

It should be of concern that populations in Moyen-Cavally and Tai mistrusted Liberians. This issue needs to be addressed since many crimes from theft to attacks on villages are blamed on Liberians. While some of the blame is justified, it negates the long standing disputes between Ivoirians themselves and is a distraction to the problem of social cohesion in Côte D'Ivoire.

### *Reintegration of Former Combatants*

Both countries need to focus on reintegration of former combatants. In Nimba County, the pro-Ouatarra fighters cannot be forgotten. While they are less of a threat than the Pro Gbagbo fighters, programs should target those fighters as well since they remain a traumatized population that needs livelihood assistance – especially the younger fighters. In southern Nimba and Grand Gedeh, reintegration is also needed for former fighters who supported Gbagbo with special consideration since they were disillusioned by lack of payment and would potentially fight again if resources became available. The Liberian fighters were extremely frustrated with their state of living but also want quick money – hence the relapse to fall into fighting. The younger generation that fought must be tended to before they become more seasoned fighters. Livelihood support for all young men should include vocational training. If programs are put into place, an assessment on those deciding not to participate needs to be conducted<sup>6</sup>.

In Côte D'Ivoire, combatants still need to be disarmed in the West and then reintegrated. Many combatants in Tai area seemed to live at the Ziah refugee camp previously and lived in fear of persecution. Reconciliation needs to begin for people on both sides of the fighting and needs to be de-centralized from Abidjan. All populations noted that the DTRC in Abidjan would not reach the west. The West (Guiglo, Duekoe, Toulepluea, Tai, Tabou) seemed to want a de-centralized DTRC to begin a dialogue in order to move forward.

IDPs in Côte D'Ivoire that were suspected former fighters implied that they would not leave the IDP camps for fear of harassment. More concerning, it was expressed that Ivoirian IDPs and refugees were waiting to hear from “Nouveaux politiques” from “Paris” before making a decision to return. Meaning, the structure to command fighters is still in-tact and ready to be mobilized if given the signal.

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<sup>6</sup> It should be noted that in Liberia, war crimes have not been punished. It's possible that many of the older fighters deep in the command structure know they don't have to answer to a justice system and therefore continue seizing instability opportunities.



Liberian ex-combatants high in the command structure need to be tried for crimes. This includes those who recruited and trained for Ouattara as well as Gbagbo to set a precedent that those attempting to cause instability in neighboring countries by mobilizing in Liberia will be tried. What is key is that fighters on both sides of the war are tried to disrupt the command structure. The GoL needs to take a stance.

Lower ranking Liberian combatants in Southern Nimba, Toes Town, Ziah, Vluyee, Wobloken and Pleebo areas of Liberia are frustrated. They are in need of adequate coping mechanisms for war trauma and how to react in communities to low level disputes and how to access economic opportunities that are not related to fighting or war.

### ***Key Findings***

Ivorian returnees and IDPs have a real and perceived threat of violence. In addition, there is a genuine fear of being targeted if they return. As such, agencies need to bear in mind the population is traumatized which feeds on real and perceived insecurity. Liberians seemed to be used as the scapegoat for all conflict in the Toulepleu and Tai region. While Liberians have most likely participated in the skirmishes after Ouattara's inauguration, they are not the sole or primary actor.

The number of refugees in the camps will continue to decline especially with the beginning of the agricultural period. However, many refugees have shown their willingness to stay in the camp for the moment as the Ivorian government has not initiated a process of disarmament and said the pro-Gbagbo can enter into Côte D'Ivoire safely or that rumors of insecurity will persist in some areas or to resolved the problem of access to land.

UNHCR has begun facilitating voluntary returns of Ivorian refugees to Côte D'Ivoire. At the time of interview, UNHCR Harper spoke about the facilitated returns but NGOs were quick to point out that while facilitated had begun in Nimba and Grand Gedeh, it had yet to commence in Harper. The issue of a clear unified message is important – as is transparency.

Successful return and reintegration of all populations is vital to further stability in the region. Liberian combatants cannot be ignored in the reintegration process and must be considered through the RRR department for those in Liberia and the DDR department for those in Côte D'Ivoire. In other words, any DDR process in Côte D'Ivoire cannot ignore this population if they want to ensure stability in the Toulepleu, Guiglo, and Tai areas. In order for that to occur, effective SSR and DDR must be allowed alongside with reconciliation and addressing land tenure.

## **4.2. Land Tenure**

Land tenure remains an issue of great contention. As social cohesion and Government capacity remains weak outside capital cities and land tenure policies are not clear or favor one group, security issues will continue to exist in the Western part of Côte D'Ivoire. In Liberia, land issues need to continue to be addressed to prevent small tensions from becoming large scale conflicts – but Liberia does have a more

stable protection and land tenure conflict net than Côte D'Ivoire as a result of effective NGO presence and attempts by the Government of Liberia to address social issues.

A common theme in Côte D'Ivoire was inaccessibility to land as a result of armed groups; whereas in Liberia land issues brought up but not always the main cause of concern. As refugees and Ivoirian returnees leave refugee and IDP camps, the issue of lands that were seized during their absence will need addressing.

#### 4.2.1. Côte D'Ivoire

The problem of access to land is ongoing in Côte d'Ivoire. Since allogènes do not have a legal title to land, many have acquired land by «purchase» or «donation». Natives, who have little knowledge, at the time, in cash crop, were to give forest land to alien and keep swampy land in order to grow food crops. These lands were often "given" or "sold" at a ridiculous price, decades ago, and today we find ourselves in a situation where the alien worked on these lands for years and have turned them over to their children, and indigenou at the time, that had many lands and gave them out, now find themselves with a new generation that has very little land and prone to claim and recover land belonging to their ancestors, which creates many tensions and is the source of many conflicts. There are two different sources regarding land tenure: the 1998 law or the customary law. In Côte d'Ivoire, 98% of the rural land is linked to the customary law, while only 2% have a title deed.

In Côte d'Ivoire, the customary law authorizes:

- Lands can only be sold but will not be legally recognized. A contract is signed between both parts but this document is usually very poor in details, therefore the land owner usually claim that he only sold a right to use the land, while the buyers are claiming to own the land.
- Entrust the land farming to a farmer in exchange of a part of his harvest.
- Rent the land in exchange of money, it's usually used for food crops fields during one harvest season.
- Some lands can be used as guarantee for money loans. The loaner will reimbursed itself by using the land and keep the harvest.

In 2004, the cultivable area in Côte d'Ivoire was around 21 million hectares, which represent 65% of the total area, but the farming area only represents 6.9 million hectares, which represent 33% of the cultivable area. The farming area per household is estimated at 3.69 hectares.

Most of the agricultural economy collapsed during the civil war. At the end of it, lands were abandoned and needed serious rehabilitation, when the civil war ended, farmers went back to their fields and rehabilitated just enough fields for them to grow and get enough food to survive. Eight years after the end of the civil war, mentalities are still the same; farmers only grow enough to survive and do not try to improve their skills, using broadcast seeding.

#### *Inaccessibility*

As a result of the conflict and armed elements in the area, there were reports of destruction of rice seeds, looting on farms, and kidnappings if rubber was stolen. Armed elements in all regions blocked access to land for payments. As a result of people fleeing insecurity and violence during the crisis,

opportunists on both sides of the conflict seized land. Land owned by IDPs and refugees has been taken and, as indicated by interviews, a reason to not return. NRC found in their survey that the land grabs led to a “weakening of the town chiefs, by-passing the de facto land allocation systems, and questioning contracts or agreements made in good faith.”

Most Guere in Moyen-Cavally expressed a concern when it comes to land. During interviews, returning returnee expressed that upon return, the lands were taken and protected by armed Dozos who were not allowing access to the land. Since the Dozos are seen as supporting the PDCI, which is linked with President Ouattara’s RDR party, it is imperative the new land policy does not favor one ethnic group or cause one ethnic group to be favored which would give the Guere cause to go to cause instability in the region.

When land disputes arise, often there is associated violence from the affected party which is being exacerbated by armed groups. According to the 2012 NRC survey, 50% of surveyed individuals with land disputes experienced associated violence. Armed groups provide an added element of insecurity. During interviews in Tai and Duekoue, interviewees would explain a kidnapping that would occur as a result of stealing rubber. The kidnappings were made possible by the armed elements that were hired.

In contrast, Ivorian returnees from August in one area of Moyen-Cavally said they were able to work out an agreement with the Dozos to access land. The early returnee’s commented that as more people began returning later in the year, the issue of land became more critical as more became occupied. This goes to show the nuances in the region.

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### **Pre –Existing Land Issues and lack of Social Cohesion**

After Côte D’Ivoire gained independence in August of 1960, President Felix Houphouet-Boigny, a member of the PDCI party, attempted to reinvigorate the economy through foreign investment and promoting cocoa production. He declared that “la terre appartient à celui qui la met en valeur”<sup>1</sup>, the aim of the declaration was to encourage Ivorian people to farm their land. As Côte D’Ivoire became the world’s leader in cocoa production, an influx of Ivorian’s from the north to south and west as well as immigrants from neighboring countries entered Côte D’Ivoire to work on plantations. This influx led to a creation of inequities as the south gained better economic status and the north remained impoverished.

In order to redefine land use and tenure, a bill was proposed in 1963 but was rejected as inconsiderate of traditional land division. In 1980, the government launched the Plan Foncier Rural<sup>1</sup>. The aim of this plan was to demarcate boundaries of the lands in dispute and to create a legal framework for land cadaster. However, the process was formidable due to the complexity of existing informal land transactions. In 1998, a bill reforming the Rural Land Code was enacted. The Code stated that « seuls l’Etats, les collectivités publiques et les personnes physiques ivoiriennes sont admis à en être propriétaires »<sup>1</sup> but also recognized the customary rights.

After Houphouet-Boigny’s death, Henry Konan Bedie assumed the presidency. As president, he developed and promoted the idea of *Ivoirite*, or the notion of a common Ivorian identity which led to defining who was Ivorian more rigidly in legal and societal terms as well as denying the right of citizenship to groups whose parents were not born in Côte D’Ivoire . This would assist in disqualifying Alassane Ouattara from running for president since his father was born in Burkina Faso.

In 2004, the cultivable area in Côte d’Ivoire was around 21 million hectares, which represent 65% of the total area, but the farming area only represents 6.9 million hectares, which represent 33% of the cultivable area. The farming area per household was estimated at 3.69 hectares.

All of this would set the tone for future land disputes, dissolution of social cohesion, and lay the ground work for inequality between ethnic groups which would result in three major conflicts in 2002, 2006, 2010.

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As Rule of Law is established in the post conflict areas, NGOs need to sensitize communities on land rights and how to access state authorities to map out who owns what land, and who can provide land documentation. The key element is to not exacerbate the situation by favoring one ethnic group by de facto or de jure. NGOs implementing in the area may favor a group within the community unwittingly. Any interventions need to be carefully planned and ensure non-favoritism. This is backed by 2012 NRC surveys on Land Conflict surveys.

#### 4.2.2. Liberia

Land issues in Liberia vary. The main security risks were concessions not paid by companies or the government, pre-existing land issues in Maryland, and the use of land in the mining areas. In Liberia, the land is only owned by Liberians with a title deed and can only be sold to a Liberian, but they can only rent lands to foreigners. The Liberian government has implemented law that protects Liberians from land issues. Indeed, the laws introduced by the government to prevent this problem have been effective; however there is an increase of tensions related to humanitarian assistance to Ivorian refugees on Liberian soil.

##### *Concessions*

In Maryland, an interviewee expressed that fighting broke out in the area of Pleebo in 2009 as a result of Government not paying concessions to a community and a company not paying high enough wages. While the dispute did not cause instability, it is the small skirmishes over such incidents that are cause for concern. The Government needs to ensure its people are looked after once international companies enter the country. In addition, communities whose lands are bought by the company or Government need to receive appropriate compensation. Communities around Pleebo seemed discouraged with the way land was bought by companies.

Little Wlebo town mentioned that each time there is a refugee crisis, a camp is built and a clinic promised to Wlebo for allowing the camp on their land. However, no clinic over the past ten years has been built by the Government.

In Grand Gedeh, according to the NRC survey, one dispute was brought about by HCR purchasing land from the wrong community member. A similar occurrence almost happened in Nimba County when HCR was contemplating purchasing land in Yarwein Mensonnah to open a second refugee camp. UN agencies need to know who they are purchasing from and the history in the region to avoid exacerbating existing issues.

##### *Mining*

Liberia also faces problems with official and unofficial mining in Grand Gedeh. Suspected former combatants explained that there is an unofficial system of staking a claim to land. Violence occurs when a third party, unwittingly or knowingly, stakes out part of the land being mined on. When the mining is viewed as legal, the miners involve the LNP but if it's unofficial, the miners take care of the issue. The mining areas, as explained earlier, are used informally to keep command structures in place as young men feel they face a lack of opportunity in Liberia.

Mostly, the mining areas need to be addressed since they are areas with potential exploitation and abuse that needs to be addressed.

#### *Demarcating Boundaries*

In Maryland and Nimba, the issue of land demarcation remains an issue. Ensuing related violence tends to break out as a result of unknown boundaries for land.

#### **Key Findings**

Both Governments need to work on sustainable land use by plantations, clear land policies that do not favor one group, and increasing use of titles and deeds to show who owns what land. The process will be arduous, tedious, and long but necessary. The Government of Côte D'Ivoire needs to begin disarming the population so weapons are not used to intimidate farmers. The Government of Liberia needs to further work on demarcating land – especially in Maryland. Further, GoL needs to pay concessions to communities owed and look into a policy on coops for Liberian miners.

The **lack of land access** is due to a feeling of insecurity or to few land monopolizing. Usually, the farther fields are cash crop plantations; they have therefore access to the food crop fields. This feeling of insecurity is a result of the crisis trauma that prevents some people to get out of their village and have a clear understanding of what is going on in their fields. Fear seems to be the main issue to land access, indeed, only a few land conflicts were clearly identified. It seems that when the autochtones fled their villages, the allogènes, who didn't have to flee, have invaded abandoned lands to grow their seeds. Most of those conflicts have been solved by local authority (land chief).

## 5. Security and Stabilization

### 5.1. Impact of Ethnic and Political Factors

***“This was not an ethnic war but against a regime”  
FRCI Commander in Moyen Cavally***

***“If [FRCI] see you, they will kill you.”  
Guere man in Moyen Cavally***

The conflict border area between Côte D’Ivoire and Liberia has a long standing history of dispute, intermarriages, economic relationship, political alliances, and ethnic group affiliations. The various ethnic and political factors that fuel fighting and destabilize the region are extremely complex. In order to understand the barriers to state capacity, justice, access to munitions, and lack of social cohesion, the underlying ethnic factors must be addressed, especially for Côte D’Ivoire. Poverty remains an underlying factor but ethnic discord, land tenure issues and lack of social cohesion will continue to fuel future wars and instability if not addressed.

Four main ethnic groups are on both sides of the border<sup>7</sup> and one main group, Dozos, are primarily in Côte D’Ivoire. In order to understand the underlying issues, a basic understanding of the groups, locations, and political allegiances will be explained briefly. It is important to understand that Liberian and Ivorian combatants and commanders have a long history of using existing command structures on both sides of the border to facilitate fighting. The issues described were brought out during interviews.

<b>Ethnic group</b>	<b>Location</b>
Yacouba/Gio	Côte d’Ivoire : Man region Liberia : Northern Nimba County
Guere/Krahn	Côte d’Ivoire : Guiglo region Liberia : Southern Nimba County, Grand-Gedeh County
Kru/Grebo	Côte d’Ivoire : Tabou region Libéria : River Gee et Maryland County
Malinke/Mandingo	Côte D’Ivoire : All regions Liberia : Nimba region

*Guere/We (cultural links to Bete): Primarily in Moyen Cavally and Tai region*

*Krahn: Primarily in Southern Nimba County and Grand Gedeh*

*Historical Party Links: Liberia – CDC, Côte D’Ivoire - FPI*

Interviewees had distinct differences of opinions depending on which ethnic group they identified with. For the most part, views seemed to hold regardless of class, employment, or social status. Among Guere interviewees, there was recognition that there needed to be partnerships with the other ethnic groups; however, it should be noted that many Guere interviewees in Moyen Cavally and Tai referred to

<sup>7</sup> For the most part, on both sides of the border, it was explained that the strong link between the groups had to do with language. For instance, since the Guere spoke a form of Krahn, Krahn were more likely to flee to a Guere area.

an imbalance of power. Interviewees said that after Ouattara became president, the foreigners and oductan owned and worked the land as opposed to only working the land. Prior, the Guere owned the land and the other group would work the land. For the Guere who fled the war, many cited that their lands were occupied by men described as Burkinabe, Malinke, and Baoule. In regards to seeking an arrangement with the other groups, interviewees would in turn state “If you are not rebel, you cannot talk with [FRCI].” It was also distinguished that the military belonged to the Doula group and the police and gendarme were “Ivoirians”. Thus, this group felt as though they were denied any form of access to justice<sup>8</sup> - especially since the group occupying the land was armed.

*Kru: Primarily in Tabou region*

*Grebo: Maryland, Liberia*

*Historical Party Links: Liberia - Anti-UP since associated with Americo-Liberians.*

While the Kru and Grebo have some relation, the language is more dissimilar than the in the other groups. Perhaps attributing to the difficulty in crossing the water and vast forest, the groups are not as interconnected. Within the Grebo group in Maryland, the Nemoclay and Klemoclay are have land issues that stem from when Maryland was an independent state. This will be discussed in land tenure issues.

In addition, the Kru in Tabou area expressed vastly different problems with the armed militias than groups in the other regions. Part of this is due to the Kru uprising against foreign farmers in 2002. As a result, when refugees fled to Liberia during the 2010 crisis, there were not foreigners previously working on the land to occupy it nor did Krus leave Côte D’Ivoire in as mass a scale. However, it was mentioned in an interview that the National TV service fired 300 people but in turn hired back only Baoule and Malinke. The ethnic dimension still exists to be exploited. This was the only area though where an interviewee mentioned that family fought on both sides of the war (pro Gbagbo and Pro Ouattara) and therefore, are committed to war not continuing.

*Yacouba: Primarily in Danane – Man*

*Gio: Primarily in Northern Nimba County*

*Historical Party Links: Liberia – UP, Côte D’Ivoire - RDR*

Gio and Yacouba communities have a history of leaders using both sides of the border to recruit military commanders. When the war broke out in 2010 and it was uncertain who would be president, many Yacouba fled to Nimba. At the same time, many of the former commanders from Taylor’s time were requested to aid the Force Nouvelle – from recruiting to training. Since the pro-Ouattara camp seems to have paid their fighters, they were more easily assimilated back into Nimba without much disturbance. However, their group still needs to be addressed in recovery and reintegration to break down the command structure and reintegrate the youths they did bring across the border to fight.

*Malinke/Dioula/Baoule/Burkinabe: People in the North of Côte D’Ivoire*

*Mandingo: Primarily in Nimba County and various border communities*

*Historical Party Link: Baoule – PDCI*

A Burkinabe youth leader in the Tai area mentioned that since the war, collaboration between ethnic groups had improved. He acknowledged that he felt it was better since the power dynamics changed in his favor. In Côte D’Ivoire and Liberia, political activism was usually the pre-condition for who led the militia groups (see Annex ).

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<sup>8</sup> While Gbagbo was in power, the police and Gendarme were accused of abuse and harassing people considered from the North.

While the groups mentioned have divisions within themselves, they are seen as one group by the Guere in Côte D'Ivoire. In Liberia, they were described more as Muslims as opposed to by ethnic group but this could be a tactic employed by former combatants to further legitimize fighting if it were to start again. Under Gbagbo's regime, this group experienced political repressions, harassment, and ethnic violence. The Burkinabe were often unable to own land they worked on. During interviews with FRCI commanders who were members of this group, three began the interview by stating "This was not an ethnic war."


During separate interviews with NGO workers in Moyen Cavally, they made a point for the consultant to understand that the Baoule people from the North, who were mostly supporters of the PDCI, were arming the Dozos. They also pointed out the RHDP splits into the PDCI and RDR. The purpose of their statements was to show the unofficial link between the armed Dozos and the FRCI.

*Dozos: Primarily in Moyen Cavally*  
*Historical Party Links: PDCI*

Dozos are traditional hunters who have migrated from Seguelo to more south western regions in Côte D'Ivoire such as Moyen Cavally (IRIN Africa, 2011). Dozos became affiliated with the FN and later FRCI military after 2002. Dozos are traditional hunters that wear charms to protect themselves from bullets and other harm. During interviews, Dozos were mentioned as guarding farms and plantations and being hired to administrate justice (such as kidnapping if there was a dispute or establishing a curfew in areas like Duekoue). The population in Moyen Cavally viewed them as allying with the FRCI.

*Easy Mobilization During Ivorian War*

Former fighters in both countries that are easily mobilized remain an issue. In December 2010, former Liberian fighters from Nimba, mostly comprised of Gio who identify with Yacouba in Côte D'Ivoire and previously supported Taylor were hired to enter Côte D'Ivoire to assist the Force Nouvelle. As fighting went south in January and February, pro-Gbagbo fighters from Liberia, mainly Krahn, were also hired to assist in the war. This process remains undisrupted as Côte D'Ivoire stalls DDR and SSR. In Liberia, combatants high in the command structure need to be tried for crimes in order to show a lack of impunity for causing instability.



- ➔ Liberian fighters supporting Force Nouvelle. Entered December 2010
- ➔ Movement of Liberian fighters for FPI/Gbagbo during Ivorian war
- ➔ Movement of refugee population into Liberia

Population Movements of Fighters and Refugees during Ivorian War



### 5.1.1. Key Findings

Each of the ethnic groups have intra tensions. Minor tensions between Gio and Krahn still exist in Liberia. But the tension in Liberia is more likely to result in small disturbances that can be overcome as Rule of Law is strengthened; as opposed to Côte D'Ivoire which is unstable and still will experience skirmishes and fighting within Côte D'Ivoire and from across the border. NGO intervention needs to account for ethnic differences and be mindful to not accidentally support one group over another. Overall, Côte D'Ivoire is in need of a reconciliation process between people from the north and south and to ensure that armed groups are disarmed as part of the reconciliation process.

### 5.2. Perspectives of and About Suspected Ivorian and Liberian Combatants (Armed Groups and Ivorian Military)

**“The war is not yet over - if the money is provided.”  
Former Liberian combatant who fought in Moyon Cavally**

**“They absolutely are the legitimate force. We have been talking to them about the responsibilities that go with that. We're calling them the FRCI, not the rebels.”  
President Ouattara<sup>9</sup>**

Prior to the Ivorian 2010 election crisis, militias suspected to be supported by FPI, FN, former Prime Minister Soro, and former Liberian President Charles Taylor, operated extensively throughout the country. In a 2005 report on small arms in ECOWAS, active non-governmental militias (MPIGO, MJP, FLGO, and Lima/MODEL) were estimated at 10,000<sup>10</sup> (Florquin, 2005) (See Annex 1). While presently armed elements are guarding access to cocoa plantations and are responsible for carjacking and attacks on villages, this is not a new feature to Côte D'Ivoire. The difference is in the population that is armed – not that there is an armed population causing instability. Security Council Resolution 2000 (2011) gave UNOCI the mandate to provide DDR along with the support of the Ivorian Government, to an estimated 40,000- 60,000 ex-combatants. While on assessment in Côte D'Ivoire and Liberia, suspected former combatants gave their perspective.

Suspected combatants were interviewed in the Grand Gedeh, Toulepleu, Duekoue, and Tai area. However, combatants did not confirm if they had fought during the war due to the sensitive nature and fear of being stigmatized with the label of ex-combatant. The age range of interviewees is estimated at 17 – 45 years of age. Prior to the interviews, 73 Ivoirians and 1 Liberian suspected combatant were arrested in Grand Gedeh. This made suspected combatants highly suspicious and weary of speaking with interviewers. In addition, some of the suspected former combatants were concerned that they would be brought to a Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) if they spoke with an independent consultant. But overall, combatants were frustrated with their status in life.

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<sup>9</sup> Statement from 17 March 2011 speech on military

<sup>10</sup> This figure does not include Young Patriots who served as Pro Government militias.

It should also be noted that when the conflict broke out in December, former Liberian combatants with existing ties to fighting in Côte D'Ivoire, were contacted to help orchestrate the war. In Northern Nimba County, high ranking commanders in unofficial militias were contracted to support Ouattara. It seems, for the most part, they were paid for their 'job' and they in turn paid those under their command structure. However, the former high ranking commanders in unofficial militias who supported Gbagbo did not receive full payment for their services. While both elements need to be kept on watch since there is always an election season, the latter remain disillusioned and can cause small skirmishes over the lack of payment. It should also not be taken lightly that the ability to mobilize is extremely efficient.

### **5.2.1. Côte D'Ivoire**

#### ***Quick Mobilization***

Moyen-Cavally has over two decades of history with Liberian fighters. After the toppling of the Doe regime, Krahn in Grand Gedeh fled to Guere areas of Moyen-Cavally for safety. Some of the fighters who are Krahn assisted in the 2002, 2004, and 2006 Ivorian crisis. Under President Gbagbo, the Moyen Cavally area was largely under militia control by groups such as FLGO, and Young Patriots. Little to no formal rule of law structure existed. Thus, when fighting broke out as, militias were already mobilized even though outside support from Liberia was provided. .

During the 2010-2011 fighting, Moyen-Cavally was home to many major attacks from Man to Duekoue to Guiglo to Ziriglo to Toulepleu as Force Nouvelle and armed Ouattara supporters were able to push back pro Gbagbo militias (FLGO, Lima). In Duekoue, as indicated in a Human Rights Watch report (Wells, 2012), former FN or later FRCI were implicated in grave human rights abuses against civilians that included rape, murder and looting. These allegations have yet to be investigated by the government; though President Ouattara has a made a televised statement on 31 March 2011 requesting FRCI commanders to control lower ranking soldiers.

#### ***Pro Ouattara Forces and Perceived Affiliates (FRCI, Bush FRCI, Burkinabe, Dozo Official, Dozo Unofficial)***

During interviews with pro-Ouattara fighters, it was explained that the Youth Militia<sup>11</sup> under Gbagbo used their forces to kill Baoule, Sinforo, Burkinabe, Doulas, and Malinke. It was perceived that the Youth Militia was in hiding and preparing in Liberia for when President Ouattara was no longer in power. This supports interviews with Guerre who feared being persecuted by the FRCI if associated as a former Young Patriot.

#### ***FRCI***

After Ouattara was inaugurated as President in May, the soldiers who were in the Force Nouvelle and some of the soldiers in the FPI were integrated in the FRCI, the new military branch of the government of Côte D'Ivoire. During the initial fighting, interviewees explained that guns and ammo were taken

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<sup>11</sup> Youth Militia was the term used but most likely meant Young Patriots

from the police in order to ensure the military had enough power<sup>12</sup>. The majority of commanders of the FRCI are former commanders of the FN. In Moyen-Cavally, two of the lead commanders for the region and four lower ranking officers were interviewed.

When an FRCI Commander was questioned on the relationship with the Dozos, he explained that the communities initially invited the Dozos to protect them<sup>13</sup>. Dozos were the victims of unfair treatment. When one community was having an issue with Dozos setting curfews, harassing and kidnapping civilians due to personal conflicts, the FRCI commander was able to intervene and speak with the Dozos. As a result of his intervention, the harassment, kidnappings, and curfew ended. This indicates that either the Dozos just needed mediation from a governmental body or that the FRCI are somewhat loosely linked to the Dozo command structure. It displays that if the will of the commander is present, it is possible to control the armed elements in visible communities. The armed militias in the forest area may still provide difficulty in oversight, even to conscientious commanders. When the commander was questioned on the potential integration of the Dozos, he chuckled and said “They are hunters. We are military. Two very different mind sets.”

Guere youths in the FRCI were interviewed. They were from the Moyen-Cavally area north of Toulepleu and came from the same village. In front of the commander, they explained they joined the FRCI for two reasons: 1. After witnessing Lima attack their village and 2. Because there were no jobs. It was explained that when Lima attacked, it was composed of both Ivoirians and Liberians. When questioned about children returning to the village after youths fought, they stated that the villages had no problem accepting them back into the community. The youths were obviously nervous in front of the commander. It was clear he had a lot of power in the community and should be watched closely for unofficial followers.

The FRCI commanders in the area stated they were willing to participate in cross border collaboration if given the opportunity and permission from their superior.

#### ***Bush FRCI/ People from the North/Burkinabe<sup>14</sup>***

In all the areas from Moyen-Cavally to Tai to Tabou, Bush FRCI and Burkinabe<sup>15</sup> were mentioned as armed groups. These groups seemed to be a mixture of people from the North who were denied land rights and

#### ***Payment for Safety in Côte D'Ivoire from fighters***

During interviews with a suspected former fighter in Ponan, an interesting point arose. He explained that the attackers in July were thought to be Liberians but in actuality, they were Ivorian and Liberian. The Liberians were refugees who had lived in Côte D'Ivoire since 1990 but left when the FRCI arrived in March. Before the attack, the Autochtones paid 90,000 CFA to mercenaries to not burn their roofs. To further secure items, 600,000 CFA was paid to the Allochtone chief by the Allogenes. After the attacks, the mercenaries were said to have dropped their weapons in the forest on the way to unofficial crossings near Tempo.

<sup>12</sup> Under Gbagbo, the police and Gendarme were closely linked to the unofficial armed militias controlled by Gbagbo which is also why the Force Nouvelle sought to take their arms (Citation). Under Government capacity, this dynamic will be further explored in terms of SSR and DDR.

<sup>13</sup> Explained under Capacity of Government that Dozo's served as community police during Gbagbo presidency.

<sup>14</sup> Burkinabe was a catch-all phrase used during interviews to mean foreigners. It does not necessarily mean that the people in question were directly from Burkina Faso

<sup>15</sup> Burkinabe was used as a catch all phrase to describe people from the north who most likely worked on the land while Gbagbo was president.

harassed under Gbagbo's regime as well as men the FN/FRCI integrated into their army as people were needed to serve in the fighting. This group is more used as security to block access to plantations, force tax payments, and as security on plantations for rubber thieves. This group is also implicated in kidnappings and rape, especially in the Tai area. In the cases of rape, women were not targeted on basis of their ethnic group but relationship to the assailant.

Since these men are perceived to have close connection with the FRCI, in some cases as a result of wearing a military uniform, it is imperative the Government of Côte D'Ivoire begin ranking and filing their soldiers and trying soldiers and individuals accused of rape since sexual violence continues to be a problem after the war<sup>16</sup>

### ***Dozos: Official and Unofficial***

#### **Official Dozo**

In communities, such as Duekoue, Dozos established their own Quartier which are usually associated with the slum area. In Duekoue and one surrounding area, Dozos were cited by civilians as establishing a curfew. If the curfew was disobeyed, the person faced risk of kidnapping. It was made clear that Dozos did not kill, kidnap NGO workers, or harass civilians in the presence of FRCI commanders. NGO workers stated that Dozos had a Rule of Law within their own ranks and not likely to be implicated in rape since it was not a part of their social code (although domestic violence and abuse was).

Since Dozos are traditional hunters who have migrated south and the FRCI view them as hunters and not military, the Government of Côte D'Ivoire with the assistance of UNOCI has been trying to create a policy that will address the issue of the Dozos. The policy needs to address: disarmament, hunting lands, and integration for the younger generation if they so choose.

#### ***Unofficial Dozo***

Since the 2010 war, young men began dressing as unofficial Dozos for prestige, safety, and authority. As a result of the unofficial Dozos that were armed during the war, they serve as a separate militia that extorts money from the civilian population and need to be considered in DDR. Similar to community police, they were reported in the Moyen Cavally area to protect villages but also to be the cause of kidnappings and unofficial jails.

## **5.2.2. Liberia**

### ***Pro Gbagbo Forces (Suspected former Combatants in Liberia)***

Interviews for suspected former combatants of Gbagbo were conducted in Grand Gedeh. In Côte D'Ivoire, there is fear among the population that if they admit to supporting Gbagbo, there will be negative repercussions.

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<sup>16</sup> DRC Social Worker mentioned about 12 cases of rape in the Tai area by potential armed elements during the months of November and December.

As fighting broke out and pushed south towards southern Moyen-Cavally, an Ivorian recruiter in went to Toulepleu in December 2010. It is suspected that the person recruited for the Gbagbo Patriots. As Force Nouvelle gained support and was able to repel Gbagbo's army, the men recruited returned to the Toulepleu area and looted surrounding villages. Various sources claimed that 150,000 CFA was provided per combatant to de-stabilize Côte D'Ivoire. However, many of the suspected Pro-Gbagbo militia, Ivorian and Liberian, were not paid and are now awaiting the Disarmament process as part of payment for services rendered.

The concern is not only the non-payment but the potential for war if the command structure remains. Since the FRCI were viewed as targeting young men suspected of participating in Gbagbo's forces during the war and cracking down on meetings, two interviewees said communication to those higher in the command structure was through cell phones and newspapers. While this is not an immediate threat, it should be taken seriously by the time of the next Ivorian election cycle if DDR, SSR, reintegration in Liberia and the DTRC are unsuccessful. As one interviewee commented, revenge is "very patient".

While it seems interviewees were waiting for DDR to commence in Côte D'Ivoire, it was also feared as a means to identify former fighters and harass their families. When large scale disarmament begins the Government of Côte D'Ivoire needs to ensure the safety of families of former fighters. UNOCI and UNMIL should promote the message through their radio programs.

In 2004, former MODEL combatants were reported to work in gold, rubber, and wood trafficking around Guiglo (SAS Côte D'Ivoire, 2005). This supports the movement provided by the fighters during interviews and further identifies the need to address land tenure in terms of unofficial mining operations that support a continuance of command structures.

### ***Grand Gedeh County – Suspected Liberian former combatants***

In Grand Gedeh, suspected male Liberian combatants were interviewed. They worked in the mining areas that bordered Côte D'Ivoire. During the interviews, the interviewees were clearly worried about their safety if the wrong thing was said. One man expressed concern in the beginning about being brought the TRC.

Similar themes arose in the interviews. Men had rushed to the gold mines after hearing of the promise of making money. The men seemed to be in their late 30's/early 40's and were taking care of several younger men who lived with them. Most expressed that the mines were not yielding the amount of gold they were hoping to obtain. In addition, they expressed problems with other people staking out the same land to dig for gold. In cases where the mines were legal, the LNP were asked to intervene but in cases of unofficial mining, the case was resolved by those affected.

When speaking of the Ivorian war, the most of men appeared to be returnees from Moyen Cavally<sup>17</sup>. While fleeing, they expressed that some Ivoirians were able to help them – while others such as the women, pointed out the houses of Liberians in order for them to be killed. One man admitted fighting

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<sup>17</sup> In 2005, a study noted that former MODEL fighters went to the Guiglo area to work with rubber, gold, and wood (Florquin, 2005). This further supports the movements suspected former fighters provided during the interview.

but in self-defense of his family. Prior to the war, the men said they worked on the Ivoirians land but made the point to say they were rarely paid. The overall blame for the war was placed on the Baoule, Burkinabe, Mandingo/Malinke and Yacouba.

The suspected former fighters worked in the mining areas around Vleyee. One of the men kept repeating that he always went to bed vexed because of the lack of gold he was finding. In addition to the money concern, he referred to former President Gbagbo not paying soldiers for their services during the war which caused fighters to return. It was explained that commanders were given around 1 million CFA<sup>18</sup> to in turn pay 10 soldiers. Since payment was not received, it was stated that former fighters are awaiting the disarmament process to receive payment.

Another suspected former fighter from the area mentioned that the war was not over and was willing to fight in Côte D'Ivoire since it wasn't his homeland – there was no interest in de-stabilizing Liberia. Another interesting feature was his view of Ivorian fighters who were seen as non-committal to their cause since the Ivorian's "Don't take fighting seriously. They eat three times a day."

The interviewee noted that with Gbagbo in the Hague, fighters would have to be careful in figuring out who they were supporting if recruitment began. He mentioned that recruitment, if the process were to begin, would happen at the drinking and entertainment centers first. But to his knowledge, there was no money at the moment to fund war. Since the fighters were not paid by Gbagbo last time, they'll want to be guaranteed money first.

### *Maryland*

In Maryland, interviews with suspected former fighters were not secured due to various constraints. However, it was stated by some security actors that ex-combatants were reported to be in the areas north of Harper at unofficial crossing points but no further evidence was found. Any intervention that addresses reintegration and recovery in Liberia needs to focus on those areas as well.

### *Issues of concern for Liberia:*

Many men have little to no skills aside from mining or little to no interest in acquiring such skills when 'easier' money can be made in mining. If Pro-Gbagbo supporters gained the financial support to pay a militia and provide munitions to cause instability in the Moyen Cavally region, some of the men would participate and have the capacity to recruit young men in the mining area. It was also apparent that many of the older men provided protection younger suspected combatants who fought in Côte D'Ivoire and were being used after the war to mine. An intervention must address two critical issues:

1. The Government of Liberia must make clear decisions on how to deal with mid ranking officers who are keeping their command structure unofficially in place.
  - a. If they are accused of grave human rights abuses or trafficking, it is important they are tried and brought to justice.
  - b. If they are not accused, the Government of Liberia should consider creating a policy on cooperatives in the mining areas in order to mitigate illegal mining and for the Government to be able to address trafficking and exploitation in the mining areas.

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<sup>18</sup> Exact amounts recalled by interviewees are possibly inaccurate. But the general idea is not.

2. Youth under the command need to be targeted for livelihood projects and reintegrated into communities.

In addition, it seemed the men were waiting for the DDR process to begin. It should be noted they expressed only participating in the disarmament portion. As UNOCI begins negotiating terms for the DDR process with the Government of Côte D'Ivoire, it is imperative that UNMIL advocate for affected Liberian mercenaries who fought in the Côte D'Ivoire war to be included in the disarmament process and for UNMIL to push the Government of Liberia for a reintegration process that disarmed men must participate in.

*Blind Spots and Zones of Concern based on armed elements (In order of Importance)*

- Tai – Tempo Border Area
- Areas north of Tabou mentioned as having armed elements:
  - Gbapet
  - Bereblo
  - Nigre
  - Para
  - Graboville
    - On the opposite side in Liberia, Wobloken and Wesseken areas need to be looked into.
- Toulepleu – Buutuo – Toe Town Area (this tri-part area should be looked after for higher ranking officials, money, and ammunition crossing the border in unofficial areas)

### **5.2.3. Key Findings**

Militias and ex-combatants will continue to have strong ties. In response, a strong DDDR program on the Ivorian side needs to be coupled with a strong stance from the Liberians Government on the issue of Liberian ex-combatants who mobilized populations for recruitment, fighting, and training AND RRR staff located in Zwedru to keep an open dialogue with ex-combatants and DDR officers in Toulepleu, Guiglo and Tai. It is evident that mobilization and links remain strong in Liberia and Côte D'Ivoire. In order to disrupt this process, the incentive to be in peace must be more lucrative than war for the youth. The mining areas must have a presence of human rights actors to monitor and report on abuse while assisting survivors of abuse with access to justice and services. Liberian Commanders who are responsible for human rights abuses, recruitment, and making decisions need to be held accountable and tried by the Government of Liberia. The Government of Côte D'Ivoire needs to try high and mid ranking officers accused of human rights abuses to set the tone that GoCI will uphold human rights.

### 5.3. Potential Mobilization of Young Adults<sup>19</sup>

**“If there was work, there’d be no war.”**

**FRCI Commander**

**“Generals are able to call kids in place and slow down.”**

**Suspected Liberian former combatant**

The issue of armed elements cannot be discussed without addressing youth at risk. Youth is defined by UNICEF as a person between 15-24 years of age. During the conflict in Côte D’Ivoire, on the Ivorian side, youth took different approaches from: taking up arms for revenge, fighting as part of the Youth militias set up by Gbagbo, joining the FRCI, or fleeing. In Liberia, young adults took part in the conflict after being recruited in Northern Nimba to fight informally for the Force Nouvelle or recruited in Southern Nimba and Grand Gedeh to fight informally for Gbagbo<sup>20</sup>. Recruitment of youth was easily done through existing networks<sup>21</sup>.

From interviews, it seemed youths joined militias and military groups for two key reasons:

- Lack of employment opportunities
- After witnessing violence, decided to join a militia or military

Chains of informal command over young adults are strong and accessible in Liberia and Côte D’Ivoire. Network of fighters has a long ingrained existence. In response, it is imperative youth on both sides have access to education, livelihoods besides agriculture, and psycho-social services to address healthy coping mechanisms and war trauma. In addition, communities and military, namely the FRCI, need to not stigmatize all young males as ex-combatants.

#### 5.3.1. Côte D’Ivoire

In Côte D’Ivoire, the youth over 18 have had an active political and military role. Prior to 2011, students protested as members of the FESCI for both FPI and RDR. The students who protested were then given the option to mobilize with arms and become members of the Young Patriots or FN (SAS). In the West, it was youth supporting Gbagbo that had the power to intimidate the population. With the official election of an RDR candidate, the power shifted in the West to youth who supported RDR and were considered ‘foreigners.’ It is no surprise that the youth took an active role in the recent Ivorian conflict – and that they now are listed as having arms in the bush and are considered unofficial FRCI, just as young Guerre men were considered unofficial militia prior to 2011.

The armed young adults in the forest areas of Tai, Grabo, and Toulepleu need assistance with reintegration, livelihoods, and education. Youth who had joined FRCI expressed they joined because of

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<sup>19</sup>Youth referred to in this section are between the ages of 18-24. While on assessment, no evidence of under 18 fighters were evident – age was formidable to guess.

<sup>20</sup>The RRR department has done extensive work on reintegrating combatants from the Liberian war. However, the command structures still exist and old networks were maintained.

<sup>21</sup>No reports of youth under 18 being recruited in Liberia.



revenge for what happened in their village. It is clear psycho-social and trauma support is needed for them to regain control of their lives.

### *Importance of education*

A striking element that came out during interviews with youth in IDP camps and among returnees was the resolve to attend school and accept each other when learning. In Tai, a returnee expressed that he had returned by the insistence of his mother who remained in Liberia. She wanted him to return in order to receive a decent secondary education. When questioned on how he interacted with pro-Ouattara classmates, he expressed that in school, people lay aside differences. This was also expressed in the Duekoue area by COGES (Parent-Teacher organization).

### **5.3.2. Liberia**

Liberia has made great strides towards addressing youth. When the conflict broke out in Côte D'Ivoire, Liberia did not plunge back into fighting despite the opportunities. In addition, children under 18 were not used en masse to fight the war despite lack of economic opportunity. However, disaffected youth still need to be addressed and improvement is still necessary to ensure the long term stability of Liberia. The command structures that are able to call the young adults to fight need to be broken by the Government of Liberia trying those who participated in orchestrating recruitment and training for war in Côte D'Ivoire (both those who recruited for Gbagbo and Ouattara).

In the Grand Gedeh, Nimba and Maryland areas, there is a trend for youth not in enrolled in school to work in the formal and informal mining<sup>22</sup> areas. Protection HCR in Maryland explained that some of the young male refugees worked in Pleebo mining for income but received decent wages. On the other hand in Grand Gedeh, an informal structure was implied to be in place by suspected former combatants who mentioned they looked after 12-20 children and youths in the mining areas.

Mobilization is made easy by lack of economic opportunity for the youth. As one suspected combatant explained, "No jobs for youth. Happy to go with if I got money." The informal structure set up by suspected lead combatants provides youth in the informal mining areas with social protection, a perceived family unit, and money. Also, this means there is great potential for exploitation and abuse which the GoL and UNMIL HR needs to monitor and GoL needs to prosecute as Rule of Law is strengthened. In order to break this potential mobilization during the next potential election crisis,

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<sup>22</sup>Working in mining should not be viewed as entirely bad. It is the conditions, lack of safety regulation, and workers' rights, and human dignity that makes mining a deplorable option.

2003- 2011

Youth Militias were used by Gbagbo and Soro through recruitment from FESCI. In Moyen-Cavally and Bas Sassandra, pro-Gbagbo Youth Militias extorted money and were accused of murder, kidnapping and rape.

2011 – Present

In Moyen Cavally, FRCI, Dozos and affiliated militias use armed youth and are accused of kidnapping and at times, rape.

In Grand Gedeh, youths were recruited by being told they would receive payment if they supported Gbagbo through fighting. Not because of political allegiance.

Needs of Youth to regain control of life:

- Psychosocial health
- Reintegration
- Livelihoods
- Education/Vocational

youth need to be targeted for livelihoods and the suspected commanders as well in order to ensure they allow the youth access to programs.

During the previous DDR process in Liberia, former combatants were given agricultural tools. However, agriculture cannot be the primary livelihood activity for the youth being targeted. In order to build on existing strengths and interests, it would be beneficial for them to attend a school that focuses on sustainable mining and land use. A vocational school should also provide practical skills such as driving and mechanics and aim to target females to ensure gender equality. If the LNP can increase female participation and former rebel groups include females, so can other sectors. The process or idea of including females in the sector must begin in order for the notion itself to begin growing. In addition to schooling, the Government of Liberia should consider the possibility of cooperatives in order to keep tabs in human rights abuses in the mining sector and allow Liberians to have control of their own resources.

### **5.3.3. Key Findings**

Youth at risk need to be targeted on both sides of the border. The RRR section, UNDP and Government of Liberia need to work together to create a vocational school that teaches youth sustainable mining and value of resources so at least they can hope to obtain middle management positions at mining and timber companies. In Côte D'Ivoire, when commencing return and reintegration of former youth combatants, UNOCI should work with chiefs and sub-prefects also to make sure those reintegrated are not targeted or realigning for future fighting.

## **5.4. Perceptions of and Capacity of the State and Community Actors**

**“Before the war, you were proud. Now you are displaced and nothing.”  
Returnee in Côte D'Ivoire expressing what an LNP officer told her**

**“You are all refugee, so please behave well.”  
LRRRC**

Overall, the capacity and confidence of the State in Core D'Ivoire needs to be strengthened in the West (and a further assessment from the North is needed especially with increased instability in Mali and surrounding countries). The Guerre population seemed to view the FRCI as the 'Foreigner' army. Unofficial taxes were collected by the FRCI and FRCI affiliates at road blocks, land entrances, and kidnappings. Those who didn't pay the taxes to enter land or at road blocks would in turn be harassed, risk getting kidnapped, or worse. As long as the government supports impunity for these crimes and does not make clear statement or actions against such individuals, it will not be accepted as the

legitimate government and Rule of Law will be in disarray<sup>23</sup>. As the population feels insecurity, parallel security structures of armed groups will continue to operate. At the time of assessment, UNOCI was supporting the Government of Côte D'Ivoire with a draft National Development Plan. While the plan was comprehensive and re-districted Côte D'Ivoire, the plan was not visibly affecting the situation in the West, yet.

Liberia has strengthened confidence in the state substantially over the past six years. Capacity is the key element missing in oversight of the Liberian government. In addition, the GoL needs to make a clear strategy on how to re-integrate low ranking Liberians who fought in Côte D'Ivoire for economic purposes and Liberians who fought while fleeing Côte D'Ivoire and put on trial Liberians who led and funded the armed groups to fight in Côte D'Ivoire – regardless of if they were hired in Northern Nimba to serve Ouattara or southern Nimba and Grand Gedeh County to serve Gbagbo.

Both governments lack the ability to oversee the 'hinterlands' away from the capital as road conditions become unsafe, especially in Liberia and during the rainy season. Most importantly, cross border mechanisms to address insecurity need to be strengthened, especially as UNMIL begins drawing down.

#### 5.4.1. Côte D'Ivoire

The biggest threat to stability in Côte D'Ivoire in the West seemed to be that the FRCI were the only government presence. Sub prefects noted that their position had diminished with the military presence. As a result, populations in the West did not view the Government favorably and saw little benefit of the Government to their well-being. In the areas where there are police and gendarme, civilians do not view them as having the capacity to respond to serious cases since they are unarmed.

##### *Moyen-Cavally*

In Toulepleu, the FRCI commander stated that the returnees had confidence in the FRCI. Willingly he explained that they had confidence in the FRCI because they were given rice by the FRCI. This stated confidence was contrary to the interviews of non-military actors. Civilians seemed extremely at ill ease to speak about the government or FRCI. Partly this was due to trauma – one interviewee explained that his son had been killed during the fighting. Another woman who was to be interviewed, declined a few hours later after at the request of her boss. It was clear the FRCI frequented her business establishment. The interpreter later explained that she was unable to interview because her boss held a political position. The FRCI commander in this area did not have the confidence of the people and seemed unstable during the interview since he feared Liberians were going to attack any minute.

In contrast in Duekoue, FRCI commander was cited by a neighboring village as providing mediation for a Dozo accused of kidnapping. But general mistrust of FRCI still remained as communities saw them as unofficially commanding the Dozos and unofficially endorsing and orchestrating kidnappings and disappearances.

Police and Gendarme remain weak in the area even if visible in places such as Duekoue. Civilians did not report going to the police with any crime because they knew the police were unarmed and therefore null in their perspective. However, people, especially in Toulepleu, desired the police to resume their

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<sup>23</sup> Under Gbagbo, the same system was in place but by Pro Gbagbo supporters. However, the system of unofficial taxes and harassment by the government in power must end.

duties. Outside Toulepleu, one of the villages reported being harassed by the FRCI. However, as a result of intervention from a DDDR officer, the FRCI harassment ceased. This is an example of why it is recommended that DDDR Officers be increased in other areas such as Tai and Grabo<sup>24</sup>.

### *Tai Area*

FRCI presence in Tai increased after the attacks in September. In that respect, the Government of Côte D'Ivoire has been able to respond to population needs. During interviews with the Gendarme, it was noted that FRCI officers walked in and out of the building and seemed to have a cordial relationship with the Gendarme – albeit, the usual tension of Gendarme and Military with deciding who should resolve cases of conflict that all countries face. Outside of Tai, the sub-prefects seemed to be the officials to report disputes to before the conflict but after, it had become younger leaders within the communities who had knowledge of the armed groups.

UNPOL and MORBATT expressed that they felt the situation in the area was calm despite rumors of attacks.

### *Tabou Area*

The FRCI in Tabou insisted that the police and gendarme are not ready to assume a lead role in protecting civilians and were still in need of FRCI assistance. He did mention that the FRCI, police, and gendarme were a cohesive unit nonetheless that scheduled activities, such as football matches, together. During the interview, the FRCI commander demonstrated that he had control of his command by stating that women from a neighboring community had complained about his officers bribing them. In response, the commander placed different men at the post; however, he did not address the underlying issue of bribes within his officers. A civilian present during the interview later explained that the commander had just switched the soldier in question's post. But the soldier received no reprimand.

### *Community Responses to Security*

Communities in Côte D'Ivoire went to three main sources if a conflict arose: FRCI, sub-Prefect and the village chief. For serious crimes, the population seemed to go to the FRCI; even though there was acknowledgment that little to no action would be taken. In DRC surveys on Social Cohesion, in the Moyen Cavally area, responses to IDPs, immigrants (Ivorian and non-Ivorian), and former members of armed groups to become chief received the biggest response. Most respondents to their surveys said they would not accept those groups to become chief- implying that community power lies within the chief. In addition, chiefs were listed in the survey as being most influential. Therefore, chiefs must take the lead in community security and ensure abuses are not committed. When fully reinstated, the Police and Gendarme should make an effort to link with chiefs.

### *Confidence in FRCI*

For the most part, they people in the major cities did not have as much fear as those in the countryside of militias. The FRCI were not fully trusted but commanders were at least respected for attempting to

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<sup>24</sup> Unable to obtain data from UNOCI on location of DDDR field staff. While on assessment, DDDR field officers in Moyen Cavally were either on vacation or in Abidjan.

maintain order. However, any rank below the commander was not viewed the same way and there was recognition that commanders must know what is happening and condone the behavior.

#### 5.4.2. Liberia

The security and protection problems in Liberia are not as grave as Côte D'Ivoire. Over the past seven years, the capacity of the State and resilience of the community has strengthened considerably since war time. According to a study on patterns of conflict in Liberia by NRC, between 2009-2010, reports of simple assault decreased by 131%, rape decreased by 61%, and trial by ordeal decreased by 74%. However, LNP and BIN are understaffed, lack resources and need to refer cases to a weak magisterial court. Most agencies have focused efforts on building up the LNP but have neglected the court system which is the other component to accessing justice. If LNP and complainant can't utilize the court system, the justice system will remain largely ineffective.

##### *LNP and BIN*

Overall, the LNP have two major constraints: 1. lack of capacity in terms of logistics and materials to provide reports and 2. lack of staffing. LNP and BIN are very open with their constraints and have the unpopular job of arresting community members or denying entry when they themselves do not have protection from a community if the community desires to seek revenge. Being an LNP or BIN officer also gives power to an individual that should not remain unchecked. In Grand Gedeh, refugees reported that LNP officers near Ziahs Town would harass and taunt them if they reported a crime. In Nimba, BIN were accused of extortion and assault.

As a result of the Quick Impact projects by UNMIL, LNP stations are present in the capitals of each county. A broken down vehicle was present in Harper and Saclepea. And in Harper and Ganta, there appeared to be a functioning or present WACPS. UNHCR stated that LNP presence in the refugee camps was to increase to provide protection to the refugees. The hinterland areas were still lacking LNP presence and therefore, communities needed to rely on community protection structures. In Nimba, Gborplay area lacked LNP. In Maryland in Barbon, LNP had no presence<sup>25</sup>.

In discussions with UNMIL staff, security was a grave concern for when UNMIL draws down. LNP are dependent on UNPOL in areas like Maryland to assist with investigations and arrests. Courts remain weak and need Human Rights Officers to maintain balance.

##### *LRRRC*

LRRRC, while lacking some capacity and technical expertise in areas such as separation of armed elements in refugee camps, turned out to be an essential and fairly effective response in the refugee crisis. However, they were strongly supported by UNHCR and at times would forget their own voice in lieu of what UNHCR wanted them to state.

##### *Separation of Combatants in Refugee Camps*

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<sup>25</sup> At times, increasing LNP presence can cause more problems. However, this just shows that LNP need to be trained and held accountable for abuses against citizens and refugees. In cases of rape and murder, there needs to be LNP intervention since the community should not be handling serious cases.

As camps were established, it became clear that there was little to no process for separation of former combatants within the camps. However, no incidences in the camps have flared into full scale fighting. With the closing of the internment camp for suspected combatants, there is uncertainty of what would and could be done with former combatants if identified since there is no strong inter-agency policy between the Government of Liberia and UN agencies.

During interviews with UNMIL, UNHCR, BIN, and LRRRC, it became clear that no one wanted responsibility for separation of combatants in the refugee camps. Since the closing of the internment camp, UNHCR seemed unsure of what would happen to suspected combatants if they were identified. It is the role of the Government of Liberia to create a policy on separation and ensure it is not used for targeting citizens that are disliked. The Government would need the support of UNMIL and UNHCR in not only defining the policy but also in training for implementation. UNHCR explained that while separation may have been an issue at the beginning of the crisis, it is no longer as camps stabilize and voluntary returnees begin journeying back to Côte D'Ivoire.

### 5.4.3. Strengthening Protection Mechanisms

In the counties in Liberia and in Tabou, existing Protection sectors and clusters attempted to address protections issues ranging from sexual violence to assault to theft. As a result of the war, Liberia had established protection mechanisms such as the SGBV monthly Taskforce and the Governance and Rule of Law meeting where impunity by state actors could be discussed and resolved as a team. Both meetings included appropriate government actors (MoJ, MoGD, MoHSW, LNP), UN actors (Human Rights section, UNHCR), and NGOs working in Protection.

Nimba County had a functioning Protection sector as a result of the MoGD gender coordinator taking an active and lead role. Also, prior to the crisis, in Nimba the mechanism was in place. In Grand Gedeh, the Protection meeting was run by UNHCR and didn't involve the existing structure. As a result, when UNHCR leaves the county, so will the Protection mechanism<sup>26</sup>. It is imperative that when a crisis breaks out, UN and NGO agencies use the existing structures, strengthen them, and to not run a parallel structure. In the case of Nimba, the gender coordinator had a strong enough role to ensure a parallel structure did not undermine the existing protection mechanism in Nimba.

In Côte D'Ivoire, the Protection cluster/sector seemed non-existent in the Tai and Grabo areas. If and when UNOCI places civilian staff in the area, they need to work with the sub prefect and appropriate ministries of the area to establish such a cluster. In addition, Protection clusters/sectors in adjacent counties should share statistics and anecdotes to further information sharing and harmonization of efforts<sup>27</sup>.

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<sup>26</sup> UNHCR Protection staff also seemed unaware of the SGBV Prosecution Handbook and the Benchbook for Magistrates which could assist them in advocating for cases. HR Officers in the areas should assist HCR staff with these materials.

<sup>27</sup> During interviews, the issues of kidnappings, disappearances and sexual violence were brought up. These types of crimes can be addressed through the Protection sectors/clusters.

In the re-districting of Côte D'Ivoire into 14 prefects, the Ministry of Women, Children, etc along with the Ministry of Justice need to address crimes of sexual violence through an SGBV Taskforce similar to the one in Liberia.

#### 5.4.4. Cross Border Issues and Collaboration

##### *Role of Sub-Prefects and Superintendents*

The Superintendent in Liberia and the Sub Prefect in Côte D'Ivoire play critical roles in addressing community violence where the chiefs are unable. As security forces are not always trusted and mediation is needed, these figures need to be included in cross border collaboration. The Sub prefect and Superintendents should be part of the cross border discussion as Rule of Law is strengthened and they should be encouraged to meet. This means the Government of Liberia needs to ensure the Superintendent in areas like Maryland spend time in Maryland to be available address the issues of the population.

#### 5.4.5. Women

In Liberia, there has been a great push to address violence against women since the Liberian war. Likewise, Côte D'Ivoire needs a push to address violence against women in post conflict situations. Aggression from the war is often taken out on women in the home. In Côte D'Ivoire, there did not appear to be a mechanism for women to seek redress as there was in Liberia (Liberia had a WACPS in the major cities). Women expressed that they feared their children getting hold weapons used by the FRCI. They also expressed an inability to farm freely since armed elements were in the forest (this was a cross cutting concern of women from all ethnic groups). As a result of weak state capacity and mistrust, women commented that they usually resolved issues amongst themselves. In Liberia, specifically Nimba and Maryland County, female refugees were going on visits to Côte D'Ivoire to assess the security situation. They were sent instead of their husbands in fear that the FRCI would arbitrarily arrest young men. These visits put the women at risk for drowning as they cross the river and exploitation if they were not given the means for the visit and sexual violence/harassment from the armed elements in the forest.

*“Women not allowed in bushes because of men with arms.”  
- Comment from leader of Rural Women’s Group on women in Côte D’Ivoire*

Women also need to be protected from SEA and SGBV in camps and host communities. As resources in the refugee camps and host communities become inaccessible, women will be at risk of SEA. In some of the camps in Grand Gedeh, SGBV was mentioned to be high. It is imperative protection agencies report on the trends and attempt to figure out why there is a high rate of SGBV and appropriate responses that include access to medical, psycho-social, and justice services per survivors choice.

While community solutions to issues are vital for sustainability, when it comes to violence against women, the state must take a strong stance to ensure women are protected by the armed forces and community members as well. In cases of rape, it should not be chiefs that oversee the case since this can lead to a stigmatization of the rape survivors in the community. Côte D'Ivoire should aim to establish a strong Women and Child Protection Unit in the West in the Security Sector Reform. Part of

this aim would need to integrate females into the police and gendarme to promote gender equality. In Liberia, the WACPS still needs strengthening and the LNP need to be held accountable when given bribes compromise a case. Liberia has increased female presence in the force to over 10%.<sup>28</sup>

#### **5.4.6. Jails**

Jails in both Côte D'Ivoire and Liberia are of concern. In Côte D'Ivoire, rumors of returning young men suspected to be young patriots being detained were prevalent. In Duekoue and Tabou area, it was reported that the unofficial Dozos and suspected youth militia have jail or holding cell referred to as a "Prison hut". The system was most likely set up to hold kidnapping victims. UNOCI needs to pressure the government to assist with jail monitoring since Government of Côte D'Ivoire has not allowed UNOC entrance. UNOCI needs to become stronger in requesting human rights be respected by the Government.

In Zwedru, Liberia, there were concerns that the prison population is disproportionately Ivorian. UNMIL, UNPOL, and HROs in the area should work with the LNP and corrections in the area to ensure Ivoirians are not being held unlawfully and verify if the prison population is disproportionately Ivorian.

#### **5.4.7. UNOCI, UNMIL and UNHCR**

Efforts had been made to increase cross border collaboration. However, meetings to decide that cross border collaboration are needed seem largely ineffective and do not translate to the field staff who ultimately are the ones making referrals as incidents occur. The UN needs to have a system that allows field staff from all agencies to have a positive working relationship. Nimba was a good example of collaboration between NGOs, UN agencies, and appropriate UN Ministries. If the Government of Liberia and Côte D'Ivoire are expected to contemplate how their policies affect a population on the other side of the border, UN agencies should be able to collaborate at the field level. In Côte D'Ivoire, this means increasing civilian presence and impact of Human Rights officers and DRR officers in the area and Human Rights officers in the West.

#### **5.4.8. Key Findings**

Overall, the capacity of both governments is weak outside the capital but increasing in Liberia in terms of legitimacy and staffing. In discussions with UNMIL staff, security was a grave concern for when UNMIL draws down. Côte D'Ivoire needs to work on reconciliation, allow the SSR and DRR process to be seen in the West before the population can begin trusting the government. UNOCI needs to become stronger in requesting human rights be respected by the Government of Côte D'Ivoire as UNOCI assists the Government with reform. As always, coordination and collaboration between agencies needs strengthening.

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<sup>28</sup> 9% of UNPOL officers are female – [www.un.org](http://www.un.org)



## 5.5. Small Arms and Light Weapons (SAWL)

Circulation of small arms and light weapons is a regional issue. The effects of weapon circulation, manufacturing, and lack of stability have made weapons extremely accessible to any potential militia with the right price. While this paper will briefly examine light weapons in the cross border area between Liberia and Côte D'Ivoire, it is crucial for there to be an examination of the impact of the Malian crisis on the weapons trade in West Africa. Presidential and legislative elections in Sierra Leone are slated for November 2012 and in Foya, there has already been one cross border incident due to a motorcycle accident. The UN Missions in Liberia and Sierra Leone are winding down as stability in the area increases over time. It is important, that if UN Missions have not done so already, to keep in communication about small arms, weapons and work with ECOWAS and UNOWAS taking the lead for regional stability. In addition, organizations, if not done so already, need to begin a frank discussion on what laws are already in place and can be implemented to prevent large weapons manufacturers from selling to militia groups.

West Africa has been through numerous DDR programs. Recently, as fighters crossed between Liberia and Côte D'Ivoire, it is known that they dropped weapons in the forest – namely in Tai, Grand Gedeh, and River Gee. Suspected combatants expressed hiding their weapons and ammunition not only to avoid state actors who would seize the weapons but also to ensure:

- Enemies did not have access to weapons
- Hidden in case they needed to protect themselves again
- To take up arms again for small skirmishes and potential full scale fighting in Moyen Cavally
- To receive money for the disarmament process

The interesting note is that suspected Gbagbo's fighters claimed they did not have enough weapons to fight the war or other means. On March 28 and 29<sup>th</sup>, IDPs in Duekoue said that Liberian combatants attempted to recruit volunteer fighters with a car full of munitions. As fighting increased, young people who went with the Liberian fighters returned because the northern army was stronger and theirs was ill equipped. Suspected former fighters said that combatants were provided an AK-47 for fighting. There is a discrepancy between not having enough weapons to fight and yet a proliferation of weapons.

From interviews and an educated guess from fighting movements, weapons are suspected to be in two main areas:

- Forest region between Tai and Grebo in Côte D'Ivoire and River Gee/ Tempo, Liberia: This is based on interviews of nearby villages who described where fighters fled and crossed into Liberia unarmed, along with an educated guess by looking at the patterns of attack. In this area, it should be noted that while Liberian mercenaries may be blamed, the majority of attackers were described as Ivoirians (and two Liberians who had sought refuge in the area during the war in Liberia).
- Moyen Cavally Forest area east of Toulepleu – Across from mining areas in Liberia: This area seems to hold a few small arms that former fighters in the mining area are keeping in hiding while waiting for one of two scenarios
  - Scenario A: the DDR process begins in West Côte D'Ivoire, enabling them to receive cash

- *Scenario B*: Money becomes available to start fighting again. The persons interviewed seemed to be working in the mine for money and to gain access to the supposed recruiters in Côte D'Ivoire if money becomes available.

### 5.5.1. Weapons Destruction in Liberia

Since the crisis broke out, the UN has found and destroyed weapons in Liberia. In July, UNMIL and LNP destroyed weapons found in River Gee and again destroyed weapons in March that they had found over the past six months (The Liberian Times, 2012).

### 5.5.2. Weapons Collection in Côte D'Ivoire, not DDR<sup>2930</sup>

During interviews, populations of refugees, returnees, and former combatants were waiting for the DDR process to begin to determine stability of the country. Part of the reason DDR is essential is not just for return and reintegration and disarmament of the population but is needed to begin the SSR process which will allow the FRCI to return to the barracks and reinstallation of the gendarme and police. No suspected combatants brought up weapon collections in Côte D'Ivoire since it would implicate them in fighting.

According to UN news service press releases, weapons collection has been on-going since June and approximately 1,300 weapons have been retrieved from 2,000 ex-combatants (UN News Service, 2012). However, this process was not mentioned in Western Côte D'Ivoire since the area has not been targeted yet. Weapons collection has remained in the capital city.

### 5.5.3. Key Findings

Weapons will continue to be an issue in West Africa so long as there is supply. Instability in the north of west Africa is increasing which should cause concern to neighboring countries with upcoming elections. In order to ensure hidden weapons are turned in during disarmament in the West, a few steps need to be taken:

- Return of FRCI to barracks or clear plan of drawdown that is shared with the population
- Reinstallation of Police and Gendarme
- Assessment on who supplies the weapons and whether they can and should be held accountable for who supplies weapons and ammunition to militia groups.
- DDR in Western Côte D'Ivoire
- Liberians leading in recruitment, mobilization, and training for the war for either Ouattara or Gbagbo to be tried.

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<sup>29</sup> Since the assessment began for this report, Mali underwent a coup. It is recognized that UNOCI has a difficult and limited resources as they need to secure the northern border of Côte D'Ivoire. DDR and SSR will become more difficult.

<sup>30</sup> DDR in Liberia is closed. The Government of Liberia needs to focus on trials for Liberians who are causing instability.

## 5.6. Human Rights Abuses in Côte D'Ivoire

The UN made a statement in March 2012 stating that human rights abuses were not mandated by the Government of Côte D'Ivoire, however, it does not excuse abuses and the government still must address them. Abuse happens in all governments since they are composed of individuals. It's the government's response to such abuses that determines its relationship with the people. The government may have not commanded for abuses to be committed but that does not mean it is absolved; the human rights abuses still need to be addressed or else the state will not be trusted by the population in the West. The UN Côte D'Ivoire has an opportunity to increase civilian staff in the West to inform the Government on how to improve human rights which will in turn, decrease tension and stabilize the region. In order for reconciliation to begin, disappearances, kidnappings and arrests of suspected Young Patriots needs to be investigated. Below is a list of where abuses were mentioned in interviews though it is not known who committed the abuses.



Disappearances of suspected Young Patriots were mentioned in:

- Toulepleu
- Duekoue area
- Bereblo (between Tabou and Grabo)




Kidnappings of those who refused to pay the unofficial taxes were mentioned in:

- Niambly (committed by Dozos who would kidnap people if out after unofficial curfew of 6pm until FRCI intervened in late 2011 and told Dozos not to kidnap)
- Ponan (by Burkinabe)
- Tai area
- Duekoue (committed by Dozos who kidnap people out after unofficial curfew of 10 or 11pm)



Arbitrary arrests were mentioned in:

- Toulepleu
- Tabou
- Gbapet – forest area (between Tabou and Grabo)



Location of human rights abuses in Côte D'Ivoire

### Key Findings

To further reconciliation, human rights abuses post conflict must be investigated in the West by the Government with the support of UNOCI. Both sides committed atrocities. The Government has the unique opportunity to start the dialogue of reconciliation by addressing abuse in the West with action and not just statements from Abidjan.

It is imperative UNOCI human rights officers interview prisoners in jails in the West to see if there is a pattern of abuse or targeting of ethnic groups/former fighters or returnees. If that process has already begun by HROs – are people receiving due process or able to since the court system is barely functioning? As UNOCI verifies abuse did or did not happen, the information needs to be shared with UNHCR so they may make an informed decision on return and provide clear messages to the refugees.

## 5.7. Reconciliation in Côte D'Ivoire

### **“FRCI have the flesh of our children” Civilian in Moyen Cavally**

In order for lasting peace in Côte D'Ivoire to happen, reconciliation needs to commence from every angle – national government, sub-prefects, and village chiefs should take the lead in guiding the country forward with the support of UNOCI civilian staff who could facilitate dialogue. At the national level, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission needs to be de-centralized and have a DTRC specifically in the West. The towns of Duekoe, Guiglo, Toulepleu, and Tai could benefit from a DTRC in each area. Sub-prefects should encourage village chiefs and government officials in the regions to encourage dialogue and a ceremony to show a unified Côte D'Ivoire. Most importantly, the village chiefs need to take the lead in reconciliation since they are viewed as having the greatest authority (DRC survey). The importance of the village chief taking place was recognized by youth in the Ivorian army as well as civilian community members.

In Liberia, it was recommended that communities have Palava Hut discussions to reconcile atrocities committed during wartime; however, the Palava Hut discussions were never funded fully by the government even though GoL continues to discuss the importance. Côte D'Ivoire should use their traditional version of Palava Hut discussion to facilitate dialogue. It is essential these dialogues lead to healing and solutions and not a hunt for war criminals of the community. NGOs could provide support by providing counselors to villages that want to hold discussions in case someone is needed to facilitate dialogue that does not turn into fight.

Reconciliation should also include trials of those accused of orchestrating mass human rights abuses during the war. The Government of Côte D'Ivoire should try Ivorians who committed human rights abuses, such as the massacre in Duekoue. In addition for on-going abuses such as rape of civilians and harassment, the Government needs to take a strong stance and hold those individuals accountable. As long as human rights abuses continue with impunity, the DTRC will be seen as patchwork to placate people instead of providing justice. In Liberia, Liberians accused of mass human rights violations during the war should also be tried – again, both those who supported Ouatarra and Gbagbo need to be tried. Liberian fighters who assisted Force Nouvelle cannot be ignored for their instrumental role in orchestrating the fighting. Human rights abuses were committed by all sides.

## 6. Food Security

Prior to the post-election crisis, the border region experienced chronic food insecurity. In 2010, 32.4% households in Nimba County suffered from food insecurity (moderate and severe), 42% in Grand Gedeh County, 82.5% in River Gee County and 72.5% in Maryland County. While the situation was more favorable in Côte d'Ivoire before the crisis, the 2009 report states that the south-western region had a higher rate of household food insecurity with 23.3% in Montagnes region, 29.1% in Moyen-Cavally and 21.5% in Bas-Sassandra.

### 6.1. Markets

#### 6.1.1. Availability of goods



While every major city or regional capital has functioning markets and supply, the situation is different for villages far from main access roads. Market access is limited for villagers living in remote areas, often dependent on weather, transport (car or motorcycle) and prices, but also from the distance separating them from the market, which often requires several hours of walking.

However, there are small local markets which are supplied with local products such as cassava (prepared as attiéké), peppers, bitter-balls, okra, dried fish. There are also non-food items that are purchased on the main market and sold at higher prices on the local market, it is usually clothes or shoes.

#### 6.1.2. Prices

Prices depend on the origin of goods; they are either locally produced or imported from Monrovia or Abidjan:

- The more the sell point is far from the major market, the more the price of imported products will be high due to transportation costs, the transactions will be more as retail sales.
- On the contrary, local products will tend to be cheaper in markets and directly supplied.
- This also applies to services such as labor or hair-dressing, which are less attractive in small markets.



Source :WFP/OCPV


**Table 2: Price changes for 50kg bag of imported rice (April 2010 -April 2011)**

	Apr-10	Apr-11	% change
Buchanan	1,779	2,350	32%
Bo Waterside	1,871	2,325	24%
Pleebo	2,550	3,000	18%
Red Light	1,625	2,300	41%
Saclepea	1,747	2,350	35%
Tubmanburg	1,747	2,400	37%
Zwedru	2,221	2,600	17%
Gbarnga	1,929	2,450	27%
Voinjama	2,383	2,667	12%

Source: Final report on impacts of High Commodity prices and refugees influx in Liberia, 2011


Rice is the most widely consumed product, followed by cassava, in Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire. However, in both countries, production is below consumption. 90% of the Liberian households eat rice at least on 6 days per week. However, due to low acreage and lack of technical knowledge, Liberia produces only 40% of its rice consumption, the rest being imported from the USA or China. In Côte d'Ivoire, 90% of households eat rice at least 4 days a week but they only produce 50 to 55% of their consumption.

Local rice, mostly absent on some markets, is much more preferred than imported rice. Households prefer to consume their own production or to store it for the next agricultural season. Both countries are dependent of international prices, but since 2007, rice prices have risen sharply. Though a decline has occurred these last years, prices remain very high. The increase of rice prices in international markets and the scarcity of rice in local markets, have directly impact the purchase prices.



Source : WFP/OCPV

Meat is not available in most markets, it is particularly found in large cities. Traditionally, households will consume chicken meat, cheaper and available. There is also a tradition of bush meat.



Source : WFP/OCPV

Dried fish is a staple food for vulnerable households. There is a wide diversity of fish species available in the market. Like rice, fish is either supplied locally or imported; many people buy fresh fish straight on the beach and then dry it themselves to increase its market value.

### 6.1.3. 2010 crisis impact on markets

Regarding the markets, the trend has resumed in most areas; however some markets are not yet operational in the region of Toulepleu, especially in the most remote areas. The recovery has not been at the same level across regions. If in the Southern regions the structures were at a low level affected by armed conflict, it is not the case in regions of Duekoue, Bolequin, and Toulepleu Danané. It is in these regions where the highest number of refugees was recorded and the number of returnees is now at the lowest (there were some villages in the region of Toulepleu in late January, still having up to 60% of people not returned).

Although markets are once again operational, there is a lack of availability of most of the food items, including local rice, preferred to imported rice. This is due to poor harvests in 2011. In addition, there is a real problem of seed availability throughout the whole southeastern region. While in the regions of Toulepleu, Danané, Bin-Houyé, Bolequin or Duékoué, there are only little or no seed markets, for the remaining regions the problem is the quality of seed available. Indeed, the seeds offered do not meet quality criteria and the production that is resulting is much lower than for quality seed (reduced production by two or more).

The year 2011 was marked by a general increase of prices on the market. There was a slight downward trend in prices since the beginning of 2012, particularly of prices of imported rice. This decrease is explained by the presence of rice distributed by WFP. It should be noted however that prices remain above average.

Regarding the Liberian market, the massive influx of refugees in regions where food security is already fragile, has resulted in an increase of the demand in the market and increased prices of certain raw materials. For example in Nimba County those prices have increased from 50% to 180%. It is the same in other regions, including Grand Gedeh where the influx of refugees was very important, one refugee for two Liberian.

**Table 3: Price changes in refugee affected areas**

Commodity	Unit	Price changes between October 2010 and April 2011		
		October 2010	April 2011	% Change
Local rice	1kg	40	80	100
Bonny fish	500grams	25	70	180
Sachet of salt	2lb	35	60	71
Palm oil	400grams	20	30	50
Gasoline	1gallon	300	500	67
Kerosene	1snap	15	30	100
Exchange rate	\$LD to \$US	\$70LD to \$1USD	\$70LD to \$1USD	No Change

Source: Final report on impacts of High Commodity prices and refugees influx in Liberia, 2011

#### **Main concerns for 2012**

If the Ivorian markets seem to recover one year after the crisis, the year 2012 will still be difficult for the most vulnerable populations. Indeed, owing to a low productive agricultural season in 2011, with a reduction of rice stocks, a production sale price very low, we could see during the year 2012 a significant purchasing power reduction of the households, and a longer lean period than usual. The availability of locally produced or imported rice in markets could be reduced and not meet all demands. However,



food distributions planned by the various international agencies should limit the impact on prices. A decline of prices should be witnessed in the last quarter of the year after the harvest period; this decline could last in 2013 if the harvest is sufficient.

Regarding the Liberian market, even if voluntary returns have occurred the last 6 months, the impact of refugees is still important in local markets. Prices seem to stagnate, but they are still very high, they should decrease after the 2012 harvest.

### ***Accessibility of markets***

If commodities are available in Ivorian and Liberian markets, the lack of cash is a major obstacle for the most vulnerable households. They are, therefore, highly dependent on their own production and limit their spending to basic expenditures. Revenues collected by daily labor or informal work are usually not enough regarding the prices.

### ***Cross-border markets***

Liberia's cross-border trade links are very important with Côte D'Ivoire and Guinea, especially for rice, pulses, palm oil. In those four counties where food insecurity is a current issue, the 2010 Ivorian crisis has resulted for them to a decrease of food availability at the border. Indeed, no rice can be found in the border markets, and the prices of other items have increased. The traders are now purchasing from Monrovia which increases the transportation prices. The same situation can be noted in Côte D'Ivoire, no rice is available in the Liberian border markets.

Despite the lack of food availability in both side markets, the cash crops trade is still working. The Ivorian rubber will be sold directly to traders at the border and then reaching big factories in Liberia, as the selling price is more attractive in Liberia. The Liberian cacao or coffee production will be sold in Côte d'Ivoire for the same reason.

There is a lack of information regarding cross-border trade, a close monitoring of those markets must be implemented.

## **6.1.4. Farming system**

Previously, only dependent on exports of coffee and cocoa, Côte d'Ivoire has diversified during the years. We find, in the south-eastern regions, new export crops such as rubber, timber, palm oil, banana, pineapple, mango or sugarcane. In the Northern region of the country, cotton is grown. With regard to commercial agriculture, Liberia is a world leader in rubber production but no product transformation is made. Beyond rubber, Liberia also produces coffee, cocoa, palm oil and coconut but on a relative scale and has less impact on the economy.

Beside the expansion of cash crops, Côte d'Ivoire has also been able to develop and diversify food crops, thus allowing to cover the needs of the population, with the exception of rice. The agriculture sector is central to Liberia's economy, which is paradox, given its lack of modernization. Liberian agriculture is subsistence agriculture to create enough resources to survive. The Liberian subsistence agriculture is mainly directed towards rice. However, due to low acreage in cultivated surfaces and lack of technical

knowledge, Liberia produces only 40% of its rice consumption, the rest being imported. That, like in Côte D'Ivoire, makes the country dependent on world price fluctuations.

The Ivorian agriculture is characterized by a very traditional operating system with a very low level of modern technology, and an extensive political opposition (deforestation) in an intensive policy. The 2002 crisis was a turning point and accentuated the food crisis in Côte d'Ivoire. The country is dependent on imports, especially rice, and in unfavorable international situation, under-production relating to its needs and depending on price fluctuations for purchase. Its exports are also dependent on fluctuations in market prices particularly the cocoa (cocoa world's largest exporter with 1.5 million tons exported in 2011), coffee and rubber. With regard to Liberia, the many years of political instability and civil war did not allow much of its population, particularly in rural areas, to access training or have a real learning in farming techniques, so today, very few farmers have technical knowledge and sowing, for example, rice on fly and expect them to grow.

Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia have a very fertile soil where everything grows, which could have a negative impact on attitudes, since it is just to seed then harvest, all without the real knowledge in agriculture. Côte d'Ivoire is a major producer in the world market, including cocoa; all exports are raw materials without added value. Il en va de même pour le Libéria. It's the same for Liberia.

The other major problem of Liberian and Ivorian agriculture is the non-transformation of its products. Côte d'Ivoire is a major producer in the world market, including cocoa; all exports are raw materials without added value. It's the same for Liberia.

### ***Traditional farming system***

The Liberian and Ivorian economies are based on agriculture, but there is a significant difference between the two countries; Côte d'Ivoire has based its development on agricultural expansion to cover the needs of the population with the exception of rice, while Liberia is based on subsistence agriculture to create enough resources to survive.

### ***Livestock***

Trend of livestock production in Côte d'Ivoire:

Description	2009	2010	2011
Cattle	1 573 116	1 581 582	1582 652
Goats	1 307 317	1 324 377	1 331 687
Sheep	1 670 383	1 692 181	1 700 303
Pigs	343 628	348 590	349 739

**Source : MIRAH/DPP 2012**

Trend of livestock production in Liberia :

Description	Unit	Year				Percent Change		
		2010	2009	2008	1988	2009	2008	1988
<b>Livestock</b>								
Cattle	Head	10,660	8,370	8,370	14,830	27.4	27.4	-28.1
Goats	Head	96,750	75,330	63,460	128,670	28.4	52.5	-24.8
Sheep	Head	48,450	43,470	43,270	60,560	11.5	12.0	-20.0
Pigs	Head	64,990	68,000	77,720	52,440	-4.4	-16.4	23.9
<b>Total</b>	<b>Head</b>	<b>220,850</b>	<b>195,170</b>	<b>192,820</b>	<b>256,500</b>	<b>13.2</b>	<b>14.5</b>	<b>-13.9</b>
<b>Poultry</b>								
Chicks	Head	800,780	774,960	785,010	723,390	3.3	2.0	10.7
Ducks	Head	48,580	39,210	43,670	39,190	23.9	11.2	24.0
<b>Total</b>	<b>Head</b>	<b>849,360</b>	<b>814,170</b>	<b>828,680</b>	<b>762,580</b>	<b>4.3</b>	<b>2.5</b>	<b>11.4</b>

**Source: Final report on impacts of High Commodity prices and refugees influx in Liberia, 2011**

The most common animals are:

- Poultry
- Goats
- Pigs
- Cattle
- Sheep

In the border regions, most of the households don't own any animals, but it is quite frequent to see women keeping chicken or pigs as an alternative to bigger livestock. Livestock is most of the time wild; animals being loose in the village, eating what they can find there. No fences or similar structures have been established to contain the cattle, and this may result in some villages into many problems, animals destroying the plantations of the farmers.

The strategy is usually to first buy a chicken or a pig after a good harvest or business activity and to keep it for festivals or to pay medical expenses or school fees. Most of the chicken production is used for personal consumption.

### **Animal health**

Animal health is an issue in both countries. There are no vet services, animal owners have to purchase drugs which are expensive, or they are using counterfeit drugs which are cheaper but have a huge impact on animal health.

Livestock owners usually only know the symptoms of the disease their animals are suffering from, they rarely know the name of the disease.

The main diseases in the area are the following:

- Tics diseases
- Rinderpest

- Worms

### ***Origin of seeds***

Keeping seeds for the next planting season is a priority for farmers. Even if their own production doesn't cover their food needs, farmers are very well aware of the fact that if they eat their seeds now, they will face problems at the next planting season. Otherwise they will have to buy new seeds, or ask relatives for support, but also at that time the price will have gone up, due to seasonal price variations.

### ***Use of harvest***

Most of the rice harvest is used for self-consumption; the rest will be store for the next season. If the harvest is good, a few will be sold in local markets.

The cash crop production will be sold usually at roadsides.

### ***Food Security Coping Mechanisms***

In Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia, almost the same coping mechanisms were implemented to face the crisis.

- Eat less preferred food.
- Borrow food from relatives.
- Used of wild food such as bush meat, leaves...
- Reduce numbers of meal.
- Limit size of the meal.
- Petty trading, buying items in the nearest market and selling it in the villages.
- Some markets with own cooking such as cassava (attiéké), donuts...


Women are usually more disposed to find coping mechanisms in order to be sure to provide food for their children.

### ***Present farming situation***

#### Côte d'Ivoire:


The 2011 food crop harvest was low in comparison with 2010. This situation can be explained by:

- **Lack of rain** during the rainy season. If the rain falls were lower than the previous year, it's principally the rain distribution which was an issue for the harvest. A dry period has occurred in August and September which coincided with the flowering, or cereals formation.




Source: SODEXAM/Ivoire Coton

#### South-West (Sassandra) – Source : SODEXAM



#### West (Man) – Source : CNRA



IDPs had a huge impact on food stocks and seeds reserves designate to the 2011 agriculture season.

- The **lack of land access** is due to a feeling of insecurity or to land monopolizing. In the most affected area, we notice that the farming area have significantly decrease in 2011, usually they are cultivating in average 3 hectares and in 2011, they have farmed on 0,5-1 hectares.
- **Lack of quality seeds availability** is an issue for the rice production. Lots of seeds reserves were stolen or burned, people had to borrow seeds from relatives or buy low quality seeds on the local markets.

Regarding cash crop, the 2010-2011 agriculture season was better than the 2009-2010 season. Despite the massive abandon of fields and the lack of rain, the farmers were able to sale their production. Selling prices of production are the main obstacle to economic recovery for those households. For example, the selling price per kilo of cocoa normally set at minimum 1100 CFA by the State currently ranges between 300 and 600 CFA depending on region. These price reductions are due to sales, the establishment of illegal roadblocks by the RFCI (Republican Forces of Côte d'Ivoire), and making transportation of goods very expensive. Indeed, if a reduction of roadblocks is observed on major roads (according to the representative of Anader in Bolequin, you must still pay 165,000 CFA to release a trailer of 35 tons of goods from Bolequin against 370 000 CFA 6 months ago); secondary roads and tracks have seen many roadblocks occur. Today, for a farmer to go harvest, he pays an average of 3,500 CFA by roadblock to go to the farm and 7,500 CFA per roadblock if he carries goods. The price of these roadblocks is charged directly to producers by bringing down the purchase price "roadside" of merchandise. Moreover, the stability displayed since one year by the country and the ensuing economic recovery, brought down the prices of these commodities on the world market.

#### Liberia:

Despite the lack of rain falls in 2011 and a farming area decrease, the border counties have increased their rice production. This increase can be explained by the refugees afflux arrived in those areas. In fact, the refugees arrived in host communities at the latest in April and were able to take part of the sowing period and then the harvest season. Some refugees who arrived earlier were able to get land to sow. One of the current problem in Liberia is the labor availability, the refugees in camps and in host communities offers more qualified and cheaper labor.

Rice Hectares, Yields per Hectare and Production by County, 2009

County	Hectares	% of total	HA/Farm	Yields/Ha (kg)	Prod. (MT)	% of total
<b>Liberia</b>	<b>251 230</b>	<b>100</b>	<b>1.04</b>	<b>1 179</b>	<b>296 090</b>	<b>100</b>
Grand Gedeh	10 220	4.1	1.0	1 270	12 980	4.4
Maryland	7 360	2.9	0.9	1 160	8 540	2.9
Nimba	55 060	21.9	0.9	1 100	60 570	20.5

River Gee	6 800	2.7	1.0	1 120	7 620	2.6
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Source: Crop assessment 2009, Lisgis

Rice Hectares, Yields per Hectare and Production by County, 2011

County	RICE						
	Farms	Hectares		Ha/Farm	Yields/Ha(KG)	Prod.(Mt)	% of Tot.
		Number	% of Tot.				
<b>Liberia</b>	<b>242,800</b>	<b>238,780</b>	<b>100.0</b>	<b>1.0</b>	<b>1,217.23</b>	<b>290,650</b>	<b>100.0</b>
			0.0				
Grand Gedeh	9,250	9,250	3.9	<b>1.0</b>	1,230	11,380	3.9
Maryland	8,300	7,470	3.1	<b>0.9</b>	1,170	8,740	3.0
Nimba	63,660	50,930	21.3	<b>0.8</b>	1,210	61,630	21.2
River Gee	7,190	7,190	3.0	<b>1.0</b>	1,170	8,410	2.9

Source: Crop assessment 2011, Lisgis

Access to casual work:

		Access to casual work (%)	Average daily wage rate (LD)
<b>Household status</b>	Refugees	33	112
	Residents	37	129
<b>Food consumption group</b>	Poor	27	114
	Borderline	35	130
	Acceptable	45	132

Source : Final report on impacts of High Commodity prices and refugees influx in Liberia, 2011

### Main concerns for 2012

Côte d'Ivoire:


- The new rice season is starting; the production and the farming area should increase due to the major return of refugees. Over the last few years, the agricultural calendar and the rainy season seems to have change, the production will be dependent of the rainfall.
- The next cash crop harvest should be worse than the previous one if the next rain season failed. In fact, today the cash crop plantations are suffering from a lack of water, in most of the area they are facing a growth delay that can still be fixed by a good rainy season.
- Lack of time to do farming, due to absence of stocks among the poorest, who have to do off-farm informal business (usually labor) in order to ensure their daily survival and cannot invest in the cultivating land, except if food and seeds distributions are done.

- Even if the harvest is good, farmers will face a low production in comparison with their consumption, which never allows the poorest households to cover their total food needs.
- Lack of agriculture knowledge allowing them to increase their production.

Liberia:

- The new rice season is starting; a lot of refugees are still present in host communities, most of them have received lands to grow and will be staying until the next harvest. The refugees presence in those counties should allowed the increase of rice production and farming area.
- Cultivable land is available to increase production but those lands need rehabilitation before being used.
- Important lack of agriculture knowledge due to professional formation failure during the civil war and no education sustainable solutions.

Timeframe for returning refugees



**Source : Final report on impacts of High Commodity prices and refugees influx in Liberia, 2011**



## 6.2. Livelihoods and the Economy

If agriculture occupies an important place in Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia, the people also use varied livelihoods to provide additional income for the household, which is the case for the most vulnerable people among them who do agriculture for their own consumption.

The forest offers access to additional resources to households, in fact, there are many animals that are hunted and then resold on the market to buy food, seed or non-food products. If in the Ivorian side, the forest has always been a provider of resources (meat, seeds, honey, palm wine, areas for new planting), the operation is not the same in the side of Liberia; very few Liberians go in bush to take advantage of its resources. Also unlike the Côte D'Ivoire, Liberia has so far been able to maintain its forest, but plots are more and more destroyed to make plantations.

Farmers with large plantations or enough money pay labor to assist them in the farms. In Côte D'Ivoire, the working day is paid between 500 and 1,000 CFA per day for men according to the hard work and CFA 350 for women (Hunger, from 1<sup>st</sup> to 6<sup>th</sup> August 2011), usually the work in farms for men focuses on working with machetes (brush), for women, rather it is seed work. As for Liberia, the working day is paid between 100 and 200 LD per day for farm work. While many operators employ labor for land clearing or planting, it seems to be only very little exchange between communities, in fact, in Côte D'Ivoire, aliens are working for aliens and indigenous peoples for indigenous.


Fishing is a very important livelihood. In fact, women and children are usually fishing either in the rivers or in the swamplands. Those fishes are usually used for self-consumption or sold in the markets like this or smoked. Fishing is very important in the coast region. In Côte D'Ivoire a large scale of boats are used for fishing, either with a net or a line, but the major part of this activity is led by Liberian or Ghanaian. In fact, most of the fishers are selling the fish straight on the beach to women who will sell them for more money. The coast villages welcome several ethnics and a real social cohesion can be seen, for example in some villages, the foreigners who live in the village are giving 1/3 of their fish every week to the village as a fee, meanwhile Ivorian are doing cash crop.

In addition to farming, some people have an additional income generating activity as a tailor, shoemaker, shoe shiner, fishing ... These extra activities usually allow families to have extra money that they will use for food during the lean season, or for other expenses such as children's schooling, health care ... It is necessary to specify the importance of mining in Liberia especially in the area of Grand Gedeh and to lesser extent in the region River Gee. In Grand Gedeh, there are over fifty gold mines that have a direct impact on food security in the region. Many young people are attracted by the mining work and abandoned the farms, the work is less "physical" than in the farm and they have access to money much more easily. There is also a change in behavior; if a young person working in the farm is bound to support his family, it seems that young people working in the mines share only very few of their profits with families.

### *Division of Labour between Men and Women*

Men are generally responsible for clearing and cash crop production while women are responsible for planting and food crop such as rice and vegetables. They should not be forgotten during program implementation because they occupy an important place in society. In 2010, 68.8% of working women in Liberia; in Côte d'Ivoire they were 45%. The division of labor between men and women is identical in Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia. In addition, women are more likely to have an income generating activity to

supplement their farming activities to ensure extra money for the household, for example through the sale of firewood or buying products from the market to sell them more expensive in their villages.



Source : Final report on impacts of High Commodity prices and refugees influx in Liberia, 2011

### **Expenditure**

The main items of expenditure are:

- Almost all the households are spending money in food, especially rice. After rice, we find cassava, fishes, small vegetables like okra, pepper, bitter-balls.
- The second most important expenditure is health. If a single doctor consultation requires payment in Côte d'Ivoire, the main expenditure in Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire is for extra services such as hospital.
- Transport represents a big part of expenditure, indeed, in such countries; a long walk is often required to go to bigger markets or any services.
- Non Food Items such as clothes, petrol (when available), oil.

## 7. Recommendations

### 7.1. Short Term

#### 7.1.1. Security and Stabilization

##### Government of Côte D'Ivoire

- Rank and file all FRCI soldiers
- Allow DDR process to include all former fighters (Bush FRCI, unofficial Dozos, Pro Gbagbo/Pro Ouattara forces, and Liberians who fought) from the Côte D'Ivoire conflict to ensure all potential armed elements are demobilized and reintegrated to deter potential future violence if a group is left out of the process – work with UNOCI on eligibility criteria to encompass all former combatants
  - The issue of Liberian fighters who participated in the Côte D'Ivoire war will not simply disappear if they are not included in the Côte D'Ivoire DDR process. Not including them will encourage more skirmishes, looting, and cross border raids and thus a prolonged state of instability.
- As the DDR process begins, the government needs to make sure former Gbagbo supporters are not targeted
- Discussion on the future of Dozo's. Many kidnappings by the Dozo's are motivated by money; however, there does not seem to be an interest in integrating them into the army
- Young Ivorian men returning from Liberia who did not orchestrate the fighting need reassurance that they will not be targeted by the FRCI
- Return of FRCI to barracks to coincide with DDR with the support of the Government and UNOCI
- Begin decision making process on setting up trials of FRCI and former FN who committed major HR abuses
- Ensure FRCI, Gendarme, and Police have a diverse composition of different ethnic groups and include elements of Ouattara and Gbagbo supporters
- Inclusion of women in the reconciliation process
- Allow UNOCI Human Rights Officers to monitor jails for abuse

##### Government of Liberia

- Implement and improve capacity of Professional Standard Division according to LNP reform policy to ensure LNP abuses against citizens are addressed timely, effectively, and appropriately
- Ensure Liberian returnees have access to community reintegration programs
  - RRR section of UNMIL to support government in endeavor.
- Increase LNP presence in Gborplay axis.
- Investigate allegations of LNP abuse in Ziahs Town towards refugees
- In areas with refugees camps, such as Little Wlebo, the community stated that the government of Liberia promised the community to build up the infrastructure (ie: clinics, improved roads) if they allowed a refugee camp on their property. These promises were not delivered. The community Little Wlebo says this is an on-going issue dating back to 2002.
- Strengthen Rule of Law – monitor Magisterial courts and improve facilitation of grave cases to the Circuit Court

- Hold high ranking combatants who mobilize for fighting accountable for actions.

#### UNHCR

- Enhance coordination and discussions with UNMIL and UNOCI on cross border security concerns based on evidence.
- Improve coordination between UNHCR Liberia and UNHCR Côte D'Ivoire
- Coherent and consistent messages to refugees regarding security in Côte D'Ivoire. Ie: If there is an attack or armed carjacking in the news, inform the refugees to quell potential rumors and display
- Explain that messages, such as facilitated voluntary repatriation, may exist for one refugee area but not others. When UNHCR states that they are facilitating voluntary repatriation; further explain which affected counties are providing the service. Otherwise, it is assumed by refugees and NGOs that the services are available at all camps when it may not be the case.
- Coordinate and confirm with UNHCR Côte D'Ivoire on official numbers of returnees and refugees prior to publishing to ensure UNHCR on both sides has a cohesive and unified message
- Protection Clusters to share trends and information (Ie: Tabou - Harper, Zwedru – Toulepleu, Saclepea - Danane)
- Protection clusters in Liberia to work within existing structures (Ie: attend monthly SGBV Taskforces meetings, Rule of Law meetings already established by Government of Liberia for long term stability in terms of addressing Protection issues after UNHCR leaves)

#### UNOCI

- Increase civilian presence (DDR Officer, HR Officer) in Tai region and Gpabet region. The road from Guiglo to Tai is not paved but passable.
- Investigate, document, and verify disappearances in the Moyen Cavally and Tai area
- Monitor HR abuses and work with Government of Côte D'Ivoire to increase Rule of Law for all civilians
- Build capacity of police, gendarme, and FRCI to respond to human rights abuses
  - Establish an effective and trustworthy mechanism to report on abuse committed by government actors.
- Facilitate Government of Côte D'Ivoire towards their recommendations
- Assess the willingness and readiness of potential fighters in the Ponan – Gpabet area
- Investigate claims into arbitrary arrests by FRCI of young men.
  - Visit jails and holding cells and interview prisoners for patterns of abuse and/or discrimination by security forces
- Monitor who is placing civilians in jail
- Remember that UNOCI is not the Government of Côte D'Ivoire and there to promote its humanitarian mandate

#### UNMIL

- Initiate livelihood programs that target young men and focus not only on agriculture but mechanic skills and education - with a focus on the unofficial mining areas in Grand Gedeh, River Gee and Maryland.
  - With support of UNDP and Government of Liberia, open a trade school in Ganta that targets ex-combatants, youth at risk/ young disaffected populations, especially those in the mining area. The school should teach:
    - Mechanic repair for land cruisers, generators, etc.

- Driving skills in rural areas - target females
- Responsible mining and Management for potential coop partners and to assist Liberian youth to become middle management for the mining companies
- All those attending should be required to go through mandatory psycho-social counseling once a week or month to address trauma
- Increase RRR staff by two. One person to be based in Zwedru to address the issues of former combatants and their needs and another RRR officer based in Monrovia to work with the GoL on policies regarding active and former combatants.

#### UNMIL-UNOCI

- Coordinate JMAC Liberia and JMAC Côte D'Ivoire to determine potential areas where small weapons might be located in Buutuo – Toulepluea – Toe Town area, Tai-Tempo area and River Gee – Gbapet area. Between the military units under UNOCI and UNMIL, there seems to be very weak coordination and information sharing.
- Share security reports with UNHCR. HCR shares reports with UNMIL and UNOCI but say they rarely receive feedback or information from the mission.

#### UNOWAS & ECOWAS

- Strengthen ECOWAS Strong Arms Control Program (ECOSAP)

#### All UN Agencies

- Improvement of information sharing and clear public decisions on who is responsible for which actions.
- Transparency!
- Improved coordination between agencies on both sides of the border. While an attempt was beginning to be made with this assessment, to be sure the attempt turns more into action and not more ineffective meetings
- Demonstrate that field staff from different should information share to improve humanitarian response.

### **7.1.2. Food Security**

- Emergency interventions are still needed in south-eastern areas of Côte d'Ivoire. However, one should bear in mind the food situation before the crisis in the border region and work toward it with long term development programs.
- In order to maintain social cohesion, any program established must integrate all the different communities.
- In order to best meet the needs of communities and sustain programs put into place, we must integrate communities in the design of the program.
- To reduce the gap in food security at the beginning of 2013, it is important to begin to implement activities right in the second half of 2012.

## **Recommendations Côte d'Ivoire**

- Maintain food or cash distributions in the most vulnerable areas

Food or cash distributions must continue in the regions of Middle Cavally including on axis Duékoué-Blolequin-Toulepleu. These distributions may cover the upcoming lean season and extend until the next harvest.

A new census is to be organized very quickly. Current distributions are based on a census carried out several months ago, but in the meantime many people returned to their villages and are not included in the program. If food distributions are replaced by cash distributions, an increased watch of local markets must be developed to rapidly evaluate the impact and to change the program if the impact is negative. It is important to limit these distributions in time to avoid creating dependency on food aid, and return to a situation of self-produced food.

### **Beneficiaries:**

All vulnerable people affected by the post-election conflict in 2010. Vulnerability criteria and lists of beneficiaries may be established by the communities.

### **Regions:**

- Duékoué Region
- Blolequin Region
- Toulepleu Region
- Danané Region
- Bin-Houyé Region

- Distribution of quality seeds for the shoal and swamp

To address the lack of seed availability or lack of quality seed, distribution should be organized throughout the Southeastern region. The late return on plantations, the fall in human capital (refugees in Liberia), the low rainy season in 2011, destruction of barns, have not allowed farmers to have seed for the 2012 season. If seeds are available in the markets, they are not of sufficient quality to ensure a "good" production. Distribution of improved seeds can be made but it must be followed by communication to ensure its acceptance among the population. If distributions must cover the entire population of a village, other criteria like the farm size may be considered...

Any distribution must include training for seeding.

Distribution of tools does not seem to be required. Indeed, they are easily available on the market and the population has developed many survival mechanisms allowing them to purchase these tools. It would be detrimental to halt this process put into place after the crisis.

- Harmonization and dissemination of agricultural technologies routes

Specific technical crop management must be prepared for each type of agriculture. They can be made during a work group within the food security cluster and then use by partners on the field.

The rice crop technical route should be introduced with seed distributions during future distributions.

- Food Vouchers Program

The purpose of this program is to increase the purchasing power of beneficiaries but also to revitalize local markets by supporting vendors. This program will target the most vulnerable population and integrate the nutritional aspect and allow beneficiaries to choose their food.

- Farms Rehabilitation Program and community farms

In areas where access to farms is made complicated by land occupation or the insecurity felt by the population, a program of rehabilitation of land can be developed than a program of community farms.

As regards to community farms, an "individualist" approach will be preferred. It is to divide the farm into lots, if everyone works in the same farm, it is divided into lots to avoid possible conflicts and to address the approach of an individualistic farming by farmers (lack of confidence in its neighbor). Tools and seeds will be made available, and crop monitoring. The approach of the organization responsible for the program must be solely advisory and support, for the sake of sustainability of the program.

- Support to returnees

UNHCR plans a massive return of refugees by the end of 2012, for this a kit will be made available to them in Liberia, including food, non-food items and money. It is important to follow up these refugees and to integrate them as soon as they arrive within the implemented programs.

- Support in the Bas-Sassandra region

The area has been affected by what the local population calls a "blitz attack". Indeed, this region has been affected at last when fleeing militiamen to Liberia in April. However, much destruction is to be counted especially in villages near San Pedro and in the area of Sassandra. If the villages of San Pedro area have access to many resources to survive, it should nevertheless to quickly carry humanitarian aid to avoid aggravating the situation.

In the region of Sassandra, the problem of social cohesion is real with some villages being now divided into two, Ivorian living on one side and the Burkinabe in the other. Programs allowing dialogue recovery between the two groups, and working on social cohesion, should be implemented.

- Support for indirectly affected areas

While the needs are in the South-eastern region, one should keep an eye on the surrounding areas of the country that have welcomed or welcoming the displaced in order to measure the impact on the local economy, especially in northern regions of the country where food insecurity pre-crisis levels of 10 to 20%.

- WASH Program

A large national awareness program on WASH should be implemented by the government with the support of NGOs and United Nations (UNOCI radio), with a reminder of basic practices such as: boiling water for 10 minutes, filter the water with a clean cloth, if open defecation, dig a hole and then cover it after.

- Nutrition Program

Establish a watch with a nutritional warning system.

A major national program on nutrition must be implemented by the government with the support of NGOs and United Nations (UNOCI radio), with a reminder about the exclusive breastfeeding until 6 months, the importance of diversification of food in children and in particular the need to include vegetables in the diet.

- Mental Health Program

Many people were traumatized by what they experienced or saw during armed attacks, they should be provided with psychosocial support and support the creation of point of speaking and listening in villages particularly affected.

- Markets' Monitoring

A continuous market Monitoring System (EMMA) must be put into place in the area, to assess their ability to recover from the crisis, and their replenishment capabilities, stocking and absorption. (At least the prices of the average basket of goods sold origin, transit cities, and available quantities of each product on the market ...).

A national monitoring must be established to follow the indirect impact of the crisis in South-eastern across national markets.

## Liberia

The assessment made by UNICEF in the areas of Grand Gedeh and Maryland last August, shows that malnutrition rates are lower within the refugees than for Liberian. It seems to be the case also for food security, which would explain the presence of Liberian on the camps, taking advantage of the support given to refugees.

The emergency phase is over, we must than put development programs into place very quickly, that will serve as support for Liberian refugees but also, Liberia must become a priority.

As agriculture is the country's primary activity, priority must be given to agricultural programs.



- Keeping food or money Distribution in refugee camps

For security reasons, it seems preferable to maintain distributions. From food security standpoint, there is no reason to maintain these distributions; they must now make way for temporary programs that allow families to benefit from new income.

- Distribution of quality seeds for swamp and shallow rice

A seed distribution program must be implemented in host communities as well as for Liberian and also Ivorian, to reduce the dependency of refugees on their hosts. Quality seed will be privileged to increase productivity. A communication on improved seeding must be made during the distribution.

Seed distributions must be made on all four border regions in Liberian villages and for most vulnerable farmers (low cultivation surface, low income, family size ...)

- Support to refugees in camps :

Beyond food assistance, other solutions must be implemented. Programs of community gardens should be established in the camps to allow having an Income Generating Activity and to not rely solely on food distribution. Other activities such as "Food For Work" or "CFW" must be established for the rehabilitation of access roads, infrastructure ... In addition, refugee camps have the potential to provide short duration training of refugees enabling them to acquire a technique before returning to Côte d'Ivoire (Hair-dressing, gardening, mechanics, baking ...).

- Creation, harmonization and dissemination of agricultural technologies:

Specific technical crop management must be prepared for each type of agriculture. They can be made during a work group within the food security cluster and then use by partners on the field.

**The rice crop technical route should be introduced with seed distributions during future distributions.**

- Rehabilitation of rice farms:

A program of rice farms' rehabilitation must be implemented to increase the productivity of Liberian farmers in the form of "CFW".

## 7.2. Medium Term

### 7.2.1. Security and Stabilization

#### Government of Côte D'Ivoire

- Integration of females into FRCI, Gendarmerie, and Police
  - This will have to allow then for a greater number of females graduating from secondary school in order to enroll in the forces; this was supposed to be addressed according to National Action Plan for Côte D'Ivoire for Resolution 1325 (2008-2012) but remained weak and needs to be strengthened
- Set up trials for high and medium ranking officers in FRCI accused of grave human rights abuses (ie: rape, torture, murder of unarmed civilians) to set an example that the government of Côte D'Ivoire respects human rights and the rights of its citizens to a trial. If trials are set up, a UN body should ensure the trials are not used for targeting (potential) political opponents.
- Côte D'Ivoire version of Palava Hut discussions (however, not to the detriment of survivors. Their safety must be guaranteed. Before this process begins, IC must decide which major players will be tried).
- De-centralized TRC in West
- Government to encourage national reconciliation through existing traditional structures; such as the sub prefect, chief of Guere, Chief of Olejan, Youth leaders to take the lead on reconciliation in their communities. In addition, female participation needs to be encouraged to close the existing gender gap

#### Government of Liberia

- Coop for mines. Must be regulated to ensure human rights standards are met and that the Coops do not become an area for unofficial recruitment for destabilized regions in West Africa.
- Continue working towards stabilization of country as UNMIL reduces staff in Liberia
- Provide policy checks and balances to the security sector to minimize abuse. Implement checks and balances

#### NGOs

- In Côte D'Ivoire, work with existing PTA (Parent Teacher Associations) to address social cohesion. Many communities cited schools as places where children of all ethnic groups experienced social cohesion. If the PTA could be used as an instrument to raise awareness on the importance of social cohesion and reconciliation.

#### UNHCR

- Consider long term livelihood agriculture programs for females at the refugee camps – and ensure the land they work on is theirs to farm for an extended period of time. This is needed to reduce risky behavior, such as sex work for primary and secondary goods and food items
- Coordinate with UNMIL, UNOCI, Government of Liberia and Government of Côte D'Ivoire a policy on separation of combatants and civilians in case there is another refugee crisis during another election cycle.

#### UNOCI

- Continue monitoring and supporting Côte D'Ivoire government towards stability of region and reduction in human rights abuses
- Set up a specific assessment to determine weapons locations and former combatant intentions after DDR process officially commences to search for weapons not turned in

### UNMIL

- Consider creating a program that targets former Liberian fighters who supported Ouattara. Break down their system of command to ensure that during the next election phase (in Côte D'Ivoire or Liberia), they are not able to mobilize and it is more detrimental to engage in fighting than to engage in civilian activities.
- Improve capacity building of LNP and BIN in terms of knowledge and materials to minimize potential abuse once UNMIL pulls out of Liberia. UNMIL needs to work with the appropriate Ministries to ensure that dependence on UNMIL by the BIN, LNP, and ERU is reduced prior to UNMIL pulling out of the country

### All Actors

- Since "No one is a soldier except child soldiers" in West African conflicts, a pilot project from NGOs should consider addressing soldiers as veterans to de-stigmatize men who fought during the war. By referring to former fighters as veterans, it might be deemed more acceptable to seek psycho-social services and provide a healthy network for former fighters to discuss difficulties with reintegration, coping mechanisms, and day to day life after war. This would mean NGOs piloting the project with chiefs, sub-prefects, and superintendents. Also, governments would need to define what constitutes a veteran and a war criminal who orchestrated attacks.

## **7.2.2. Food Security and Livelihoods**

### **Recommendations Côte d'Ivoire**

- Agricultural Cooperatives

Once the emergency is over, we must, as soon as of 2012 ending, start a process of strengthening the agricultural cooperatives in the region. If these cooperatives already exist, they are often poorly structured and less known in the villages. An awareness campaign to the usefulness and purpose of these cooperatives must be made.

- Microcredit Organizations and banking system

The lack of trust towards financial structures does not encourage people to use them. The only structure in which people seem to have some "confidence" is COOPEC. We must therefore strengthen the structure.

An organization specialized in micro-credit should develop projects across the region, because even if the conflict had a significant impact on the population, many have developed coping mechanisms that allowed them to earn money.

A notice on the possibilities of micro-credit must be made within the villages.

- Income Generating Activity for Reconstruction

An IGA can be set up to support the reconstruction of housing and leans. This IGA type can be, wood processing. Indeed, the South Eastern is a woody region where quality wood can be found to allow the construction of structures and then use the mud to complete the house. The interest in wood processing is also an added value to the wood processing significant. Côte d'Ivoire has already begun its forest processing, it is therefore necessary to add a reforestation program.

The other IGA possibility is the making of cement brick that would allow having concrete structures and therefore more sustainable.

## Liberia

- Support to the creation of agricultural cooperatives and strengthening of the existing ones

There are very few cooperatives in Liberia, it is therefore necessary to provide support to the creation of it and strengthen existing ones.

### **7.3. Joint recommendations on long term measures**

- School gardens

To counter the lack of food in schools and educate children vegetables growing, a large-scale program of school gardens should be established. In some villages where canteens are already available, only the technical support will be provided with training teachers in the vegetable growing, the supply of seeds and tools and regular monitoring of the garden. To ensure the use of crops in the diet of children, training in cooking should be implemented. If harvests are higher, some may be sold to enable the school to have some cash for equipment. If the village does not have a canteen, seek community support to achieve it. Access to water at each site must be implemented.

On a sample village, such program can be implemented with additional training in cooking vegetables for children. A cooking competition would be introduced in the village with a "tasting" proposed to the villagers to raise awareness of food diversification.

- "Schools-Farms-Farmers" Project

The "School-Farm-farmers" program allows grouping a score of 20 farmers and improving their farming techniques. Indeed, the purpose of this program is to have an approach of training of trainers in farming, to observe the problems of the farms, analyze it and find a solution together.

- Community gardens set for women

The community garden program will target women in order to augment their financial contributions in the household, but also because women's groups seem to work very naturally than men's groups. The men will be involved in this project because there are, in term of division of labor, in charge of farm clearing. Organizations provide quality seed and various tools for undertaking market gardening. Technical support will be developed with training involving full technical route, when and how to plant seeds, how and when to water the plantations, when and how to use fertilizers, how to minimize the damage done by insects with the production of organic pesticide, how to make their own compost and how to use it, how to create a seedlings nursery...

Regular support must be set up with weekly visits to the farms to verify that all steps are followed.

When choosing the field, ensure that it is near a water source, that it is not too far from the village before to ease the access.

- Products Processing Integrated Program:

An integrated rice processing program must be implemented. Indeed, rice is harvested, sold or stored for next season, it is not processed or by hand. To revitalize the trade local rice and improve the terms of trade, the program will be divided into several stages :

- Rehabilitation of rice farms
- Distribution of seeds and tools, as well as storage equipment
- Training in the multiplication of quality seeds to ensure the quality and sustainability of crops.
- CFW program will allow rehabilitating the road leading to market
- Cash for machines Program will allow rice processing.

- Rehabilitation of markets and construction of storage facilities

Many markets are in need of rehabilitation following the conflict, the goal is to revitalize the local economy and increase supply. The rehabilitation of markets can be done through a CFW program more comprehensive that would range from support to the farmer up to the consumer.

The set up of storage facilities on the markets should be considered especially in areas where the rainy season limits the access, to allow a constant supply of stalls. These storage areas may be concrete constructions whose responsibility will be of the vendors that are using it or tosh that would allow the storage of rice.

- Vocational training school in agriculture

Agriculture is the life stream of the Ivorian economy but lacks sophistication. The other problem that emerges is the lack schooling among the youth after primary school despite youth is tomorrow's producers. The government with the help of specialized organizations must implement free agricultural vocational training school.

Entrance will be from 14 years of age and would offer a degree after 2 years of learning. The school will include theoretical part and technical part. It is therefore necessary to provide a building facility but also lands so that they can learn directly in the fields. The modules will cover all types of agriculture (cash food, market gardening, agro-forestry, intensive farming, modern agriculture ...). Production can be sold to pay students tuition fees.

- Training in Agriculture

More generally, general training in agricultural techniques is necessary for all regarding modernization of agriculture, fertilizers, pesticides and raising of animal ... This training can be done by the system training of trainers. Farmers who already have a certain technique will be chosen by communities, and will be trained and then train their colleagues.

Training in seed multiplication must be proposed to the community, to allow farmers to reproduce seeds and increase their production capacity or to sell them on the market.

- Agriculture Modernization Program

A program of modernization of agriculture must be developed in order to modernize it. This program can be done in the form of cash for machine or in the form of microcredit through organized bodies like COOPEC.

- Training to livestock and its technical

There is an importance misunderstanding of intensive breeding techniques, there are many animals in the villages but they are "left to their own" and nobody cares. Training in animal breeding is required with training in animal health care and the monitoring of live stocks, and training in the creation of animal feeding.

## 7.4. General Recommendations

### Coordination

- Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire must coordinate their actions. While both countries are different, there are many similarities between these two regions. The border is very porous, and there are exchanges between the two countries; the same ethnic groups are found on each side, the soil is the same. Côte D'Ivoire and Liberia share many common challenges. What happens on one side of the border will have an effect on the other side. You have to work on cross-border and monitor them.
- Similar programs can be conducted simultaneously on both sides of the border. To do this, it must be supported by organizations present on the ground ever since, with good knowledge of the issues on both sides of the border to mount projects.
- The Ministries of Agriculture of both countries must work together. This exchange will allow mutual enrichment.

- The UN agencies are present on both sides; if a macro-coordination appears to be difficult, every agency needs to work together with that of the neighboring country.
- NGOs developing programs of each side of the border are already present such as DRC and NCR and already have a regional approach to these programs (food security, WASH, protection ...). Other NGOs such as ACF, CARE, Oxfam, and Solidarity ... are also present and have a certain expertise in food security.
- Assessments should be coordinated. Many assessments of the same region were conducted in Côte D'Ivoire by different agencies with different methodology. A common methodology needs to be established that would facilitate comparisons between different regions. Moreover, the establishment of a consortium with several organizations working in the same region would have a single evaluation, and that everyone works on the basis of identical information.
- A good food security evaluation system has been established by the Ministry of Agriculture, the IPC provides regular updates on the situation, and organizations must work with them to optimize these evaluations. With regard to Liberia, the evaluation process seems to be more complicated. The Ministry of Agriculture should establish a regular monitoring system. The harmonization of the process with that of Côte D'Ivoire could allow access to more information.
- Sharing assessments is essential for all, the clusters appear to be the best place to share assessments.
  - A mapping of each organization activities by sector must be developed and shared.
  - In Liberia, the creation of cluster agriculture or early recovery is necessary to begin to implement development projects. Emphasize being done mainly on food distribution at the meeting on food security sector.
  - An organization shall be responsible for funding programs put into place. Indeed, whether in Côte D'Ivoire or Liberia, many projects have been implemented for years without capitalization. But today, the same projects are initiated and will not have the desired effect because they were made without taking into account the mistakes made in the past.
- A monitoring should be set up a year after the agency's departure to measure its impact on the community and its sustainability.

#### Community Program

- Communities must be included in the whole process of a program, from writing to the departure of the agency. Many programs have been implemented by organizations and are obsolete now while said "sustainable"; because the community has not been sufficiently included into the process and that the program did not meet their expectations.

## 8. Annex 1: Presence of Armed Militias in 2003

### Supporters of Soro and Taylor

**FN (Force Nouvelle):** Formed in 2003 after the Linas-Marcoussis Accord, FN integrated armed groups of MJP, MPCJ, and MPIGO. The MPCJ was the strongest group since funds for MJP and MPIGO faltered after Taylor's arrest. FN attempted to vet out Sierra Leonean and Liberian mercenaries who were committing abuses. FN controlled the military and administrative services in the northern part of the country as outlined in the Accord backed by UNOCI and French forces. FN controlled the 'zone of confidence'. Leader: Political positions held:

**MJP:** Formed in 2002 after MPCJ signed the ceasefire with the government, MJP was composed of Liberians, Sierra Leoneans and Ivoirians. Suspected to receive funds from Taylor but Taylor was reported to favor the MPIGO. Integrated into FN in 2003.

**MPCJ:** Formed in 2002 after the coup against Guei and to oust Gbagbo, MPCJ was composed of Yacouba and northerners from Mali and Burkina Faso. In addition, MPCJ recruited former combatants from refugee camps in Ghana and Dozo's from Côte D'Ivoire, Mali and Burkina Faso. Financial support included funds from RDR members and allegedly Charles Taylor though not all MPCJ Liberian members supported Taylor (Berger – Côte D'Ivoire). MPCJ joined the FN in 2003.

**MPIGO:** Formed in 2002 after the coup against Guei to defend the Yacoubas, MPIGO was organized by Taylor's and Guei's leading commanders (and was composed of Yacoubas from Côte D'Ivoire, Liberia and Sierra Leone). Armed and trained in Liberia by Taylor's supporters. Integrated into the FN in 2003.



### Supporters of Gbagbo / Anti-Taylor

**FESCI:** Emerging in 2002 as an armed group, FESCI were mobilized students promoted by Gbagbo in the 1980s while he was dean at the University de Cocody-Abidjan. Leader: Political positions held:

**FLGO:** Liberian Krahn and We/Guere Ivoirians supporting Gbagbo, the FLGO was the main militia in the West supporting Gbagbo. FLGO was also implicated in fighting with MODEL to push back Taylor's government forces. Leader: Political positions held:

**MODEL/Lima:** Organized in 2003 by mostly ethnic Krahn who split from LURD, was an active militia in the Grand Gedeh and River Gee areas of Liberia in 2003. Many of the members were former FANCI and pro-Gbagbo militia. Their aim was to overthrow then President Taylor. MODEL/Lima participated in the 2003 Ivorian conflict in support of former President Gbagbo; in turn, they received weapons and uniforms from Côte D'Ivoire. In 2005, the Small Arms Survey cited MODEL as "remains well organized" after having participated in DDDR. During the 2011 Ivorian conflict, MODEL/Lima were implicated in fighting in Moyen-Cavally and in Tai during interviews.



**Young Patriots:** Student network that supported Gbagbo and trained by FANCI. Young Patriots were said to be in hiding during interviews. However, it is suspected that Young Patriots was the blanket term for all fighters supporting Gbagbo during the 2011 Ivorian crisis.

(Sources: SAS Liberia, SAS Côte D'Ivoire, International Peacekeeping)

## 9. Annex 2: Infrastructure

### *Transport*

Its roads facilitate trade with neighboring countries like Guinea, Burkina Faso, Mali, Liberia and Ghana. Economic activity is mainly located in the south, in Abidjan, and in another measure in San Pedro, the road becomes a real problem in terms transportation of goods, transport costs being much higher. Also, some tracks are rendered impassable during the rainy season, resulting in an isolation of some villages and a limited supply of goods. With regard to Liberia, the country has very few roads with only 6% of paved roads, the rest being tracks. The state of this infrastructure is a bottleneck in the Liberian economy. Indeed, the economy of Liberia is also located almost exclusively in the outskirts of the capital, which limits trade with the rest of the country; for example two days are needed to rally Monrovia to Harper. Moreover, roads are impassable during the rainy season (usually from July to October) and some regions are in autarky.

Côte d'Ivoire has two large spans ports with those of Abidjan and San Pedro, these ports have been largely modernized and allow the import of many products to Côte d'Ivoire but also to West Africa's landlocked countries. However these two ports being located in the south, there is a concentration of resources around these two cities; the distribution of wealth is very uneven in the country. Liberia has five ports (Monrovia, Buchanan, Greenville, Harper and Robertsport); a sea route was created to link and facilitate trade between different regions. The port of Monrovia allows many trades, including the export of rubber and iron and import of processed materials. Although the transit of goods is carried from one port to another, the current port infrastructures remain very low and do not allow the regions to take off or replace the roads network.

Liberia and Côte D'Ivoire are equipped with an international airport. The Abidjan airport is much more developed than that of Liberia and direct flights are organized especially to Paris or Brussels, several African capitals are also directly connected by the two airports.

Regarding public transport, if there are few buses in major Ivorian cities like Abidjan or San Pedro, to travel out of these cities or in rural areas, the Ivorians as the Liberians use taxis. Available in all cities and at affordable prices, most are of poor quality. For shorter trips, the motorcycle taxi is a very common means of transportation in both countries; its price is very affordable. Particularly in isolated villages where we have very few or no taxis or motorcycle taxis, people prefer cycling or walking to get around.

### *Telecommunications*

Ivorian and Liberian mobile phones networks cover virtually the entire territory. In Côte d'Ivoire, in 2009, 24.1% of low income households own a mobile phone, 60.2% for the middle class households and 83.2% for the richest households. (Ministry of Agriculture, 2009) Mobile phones used are easily rechargeable through the purchase of units, the amount of which the lowest is 100 CFA and 1 USD. The use of mobile phones seems very important especially for the low income households because many money transfers are done through this, coming from families living in the capital city or abroad. Little or no fixed telephone network is present in both countries.

The access to the internet is much more developed in Côte d'Ivoire than in Liberia. Indeed, it is available in Monrovia, it is virtually non-existent outside the capital city, and however, it is possible to buy a USB to connect to the internet in most major cities using the EDGE network. In Côte d'Ivoire, throughput and stability of the proposed network are significantly more reliable than in Liberia, wireless connections are available in major cities and you can find access to an internet cafe in the cities of medium size to have access to the internet even if the network is very low. On the other hand as in Liberia, the USB Internet exist and can be used in the field.

### *Energy*

The access to electricity is different from one side of the border and the other. Indeed, Côte d'Ivoire provides access to the national electricity grid more common than in Liberia. Many cities are well connected directly to electricity; however, many villages remain dependent on generators and fuel prices. In Liberia, the grid was completely destroyed during the civil war and it is still difficult to be connected to the national grid in Monrovia and in addition, prices remain very high. Many large institutions in Monrovia run on generators. It is impossible to have access to the national grid in rural areas, in many villages the purchase of generator or even fuel is impossible because it is too expensive.

### *Health*

In Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia, there are hospitals in most major cities in different regions. In villages, access to health care is much more complicated, in fact, many villages have no health center and residents often have to travel several kilometers to get to the nearest health center. If a health center exists, it is not always well supplied with drugs and / or staff, and is then unable to treat patients. In Liberia, access to health care in health centers and drugs are free, this is not the case in Côte d'Ivoire where families often have to cut down their budget to access health care. In both countries, the most important care (hospital) is chargeable and expensive for low-income families. In addition, there is a technical and technological lacking in some institutions, forcing some patients to travel to the capital to have access to appropriate care and going into debt when the amount is too high; in 2009, 23% of households indebted to spend on health care (Ministry of Agriculture, 2009).

### *Banking system*

Both countries have their own currency, the CFA franc in Côte D'Ivoire and Liberian Dollar in Liberia. Côte d'Ivoire has established a fixed exchange rate between the CFA and the Euro, which is 1 euro for 655.957 CFA, and primarily uses its currency. Liberia has a fluctuating exchange rate, which now stands at 1 USD for approximately LD 70; if the local currency is used across the country and that many of the transactions in rural areas are in LD, the U.S. Dollar is still very present in the Liberian economy. Indeed, all common transactions are made in USD and ATMs machines are supplied in USD.

Ivorian and Liberian systems work only minimally outside the capital, where they are particularly used by those employed or more privileged people. In rural areas, there are only very few bank branches, only in regional capitals, but there is a real distrust of the people to resort to these institutions, judging them to be corrupt. They prefer to keep their money in safety in their homes.

To counter this distrust of the banking system, groups have been established in some villages, setting up a system of tontine. A group of people puts money aside each week and when someone in the village is in need, they are able to lend him money. For example, a group of 10 people will set aside 100 CFA per

person and per week and they will be able to lend the sum of FCFA 10,000 and be reimbursed 12 000 FCFA after two or months; which is mutual assistance between people and allows people of the group to increase their cash. With regard to farmer groups or cooperatives, it seems that their performance is very sporadic; it seems there is a real lack of knowledge regarding the opportunity provided by micro-credit and interest to join particularly for modernizing agriculture. In Côte D'Ivoire, one notes that there are very few of such groups due to a lack of trust between the Ivorian villagers; this solidarity is much greater among the non-indigenous. On the Liberian side, the groups seem to work more easily.

### *Water and Sanitation*

There are numerous water points in the Southeastern region; indeed, there are many rivers across the region, there are also many lakes or ponds and direct access to the ocean, making the soil very fertile. However, access to clean water is a problem in rural areas of Côte d'Ivoire. If water is found by systematically digging the ground in the south-eastern regions of the Country, we note that little villages have wells with hydraulic pumps or sufficient for the village. In 2009, near 44% of rural food insecure households lacked access to safe drinking water in the Côte D'Ivoire, and 40% in Liberia. Water is often drawn directly into streams or wells dug by the people. It is consumed directly without being processed or filtered, resulting in some villages having acute diarrhea cases, particularly among children. Many hydraulic pumps have been developed by different organizations but are now obsolete. Drainage systems are in place in some towns or villages in Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia, but the infrastructures remain fragile and are often useless during heavy rains or destroyed.

In term of sanitation, the lack is even more important since 2008, according to UNICEF, 8 million people (43% of the population) lacked access to basic sanitation. In Liberia, it was nearly 81% of the rural population that lacks access to sanitation. Indeed, faced with this lack of sanitation, many people resort to open defecation, which could have a direct impact on the population, particularly in terms of disease transmission (e.g. cholera).

Many hydraulic pumps management groups or latrines have been set up, mainly to ensure their maintenance by NGOs, but these groups do not seem to work anymore in Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire, due to lack of investment and motivation of those group members.

### *Nutrition*

If beside the crisis that Côte d'Ivoire has experienced and since the end of the civil war in Liberia, the nutritional situation is, in itself, not alarming. The nutritional problem does not seem to come from a lack of food, most children consuming at least 2 to 3 meals a day, but a lack of dietary diversity. In addition, exclusive breastfeeding the first few months does not seem respected; many women choose to use Nido milk powder very quickly after delivery, this product being very common in the markets. Women in Ivorian rural area occupy a prominent position in households since it is them that are going to the farm and particularly taking care of rice crops, exclusive breastfeeding becomes a hindrance to their agricultural output. In addition, if breastfeeding is recommended up to two years, the child was quickly weaned from his mother and then prepared meals are mainly consist of rice or tapioca, without introducing concept of food diversification. This lack can cause numerous deficiencies in children and play on its future development. Indeed, accustomed to eating rice or cassava, very few households do consume vegetables; they are not introduced into the diet of the infants.

Regarding adults, their diet is generally composed of three meals a day, as for the children, their staple food is rice or cassava. The meals are prepared outside, and cooked with wood fire or charcoal. The water used is usually taken directly from the wells and put to boil, and then the women prepare a sauce that will allow them to decorate rice or cassava, vegetables; very often, they are produce by themselves near the house. Rice can be accompanied, particularly in Côte d'Ivoire, with bush meat purchased on the local market or hunted in the forest, or fish caught in rivers or in marshes.

### *Education*

If access to primary education is relatively easy due to the presence of infrastructure in many villages in Côte d'Ivoire and Liberia, there are important halts in school attendance by students. Indeed, in Côte d'Ivoire access to primary education is paid and it represents an important part of the budget; we must also foresee the cost of school uniforms. Access to primary education is free in Liberia but families must provide uniforms and pay unofficial entry fees so their children can attend school. The other obstacle to schooling is that, very often, if the village does not have its own school structure, the child will sometimes travel up to 10 km to reach to the nearest school. Very few schools have a canteen available to students, they are forced to return home in order to eat lunch, and very few will go back to school in the afternoon. However many programs initiated mainly by UNICEF and partner organizations such as the supply of school materials, school feeding programs or teacher training, allowed an increase in school attendance. However, the rate of school attendance remains relatively low.

Once completed primary education, very few of them will go to secondary school, the vast majority of these institutions being paid. In Côte d'Ivoire in 2008, the enrollment rate in secondary education was only 20%. It's the same for higher education where institutions are getting more and more private. Literacy rates and education rates are relatively low. Once pass the age of 12, most children are found working in the farms to contribute to the increase of family's incomes.

## 10. Annex 3: Composition and Structure of Households

The average size of household in Côte d'Ivoire was estimated in 2009 to 12 people (WFP, 2007), against an average of 5 persons in Liberia (LISGIS, 2008). The averages are different if the households are coming rural or urban areas.

In Liberia and Côte d'Ivoire, the gender ratio in the household is almost equal. However, the majority of head of households are male, respectively 97% (LISGIS, 2008) and 92% (WFP, 2007), all decisions are taking by men. In addition, inheritances of land property are in vast majority from father to son, if there is no son, the daughter will inherit but her husband will have the usufruct of the legacy. In Liberia, there is a Domestic Relation Law which states the wife should receive 1/3 of the land. NGOs should use this law to promote rights of the female to own land.

Usually only one family lives in a house. Homes in Côte d'Ivoire and in Liberia are traditional made of a wooden frame and covered with mud; the roof is usually cover with dried palm leaves. This habitat has the advantage to be very cheap and materials are available in every side. Concreted structures are less common and generally concern health center, chiefs' house or wealthy people. Houses are usually composted with two rooms where the family sleeps and stores its possession.

Some families have built barns on their land to store their rice after the harvest for personal consumption or for planting in the next season. These barns are built with the same materials as the houses. Usually the top is used to store rice plants in order to dry and then peel them manually, which often causes many brooks, which are found in rice during his sacking.

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